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ABSTRACT
Inkatha, Propaganda, and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 90s
by Michael MacInnes

The 1980s and 1990s marked the beginning of the end of Apartheid in South Africa but
before the first fully democratic election in 1994, the KwaZulu-Natal region was being torn apart
by a low level civil war. This conflict was not the black majority fighting against white minority,
but part of so-called black on black violence. One side was the African National Congress
(ANC) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) and on the other was Inkatha, secretly backed by
the Apartheid state. Originally a Zulu nationalist liberation movement aligned with the ANC,
Inkatha separated with the ANC over issues of ideology and politics. Instead, Inkatha secretly
began working with the Apartheid government and engaging in violence against the ANC and
their successor the UDF.
This thesis seeks to understand Inkatha’s role in the violence in KwaZulu-Natal by
looking at what motivated Inkatha’s supporters to engage in violence. The main motivators
examined in this thesis can be understood in the three categories of propaganda, coercion, and
opportunistic and survival based violence. By utilizing interviews, newspapers, testimony, and
more this thesis seeks to explore the experience of both those who were affected and perpetrated
the violence to answer this question.
Finally, this thesis will follow the story of the Caprivi operatives, a group of Inkatha
supporters trained by the Apartheid state to engage in violence and murder against the ANC and
their allies during the transition period. By following the stories of these men and particularly
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their leader, Daluxolo Luthuli, this thesis will illustrate how the same motives explored above
affect their decisions to engage in violence.
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Introduction
On March 25, 1990, in the twilight years of South African Apartheid, the low-intensity
civil war that had been raging in the eastern region of KwaZulu-Natal between the African
National Congress/United Democratic Front (ANC/UDF) and their political rival Inkatha entered
a new, bloody phase. After an Inkatha rally, hundreds of armed men, aided by white and black
police, engaged in organized raids on regional villages and townships viewed as supporting the
UDF. For example, in the township of Kwamnyandu that afternoon, three Inkatha members
armed with pistols shot twelve unarmed men in a store. A few hours later, several others had
their homes burned and belongings taken.1
By March 28, the violence had only escalated. Somewhere between 800 and 1000
Inkatha members entered Gezubuso both by truck and on foot. They targeted specific houses for
arson and moved through the township to find more UDF homes. In response, nearly 150
comrades (term for UDF fighters) moved to a nearby hill and prepared for a fight. However,
when they confronted the Inkatha men they found themselves out-flanked and out-gunned by the
superior Inkatha force and retreated. Fighting resumed later that day, creating an untold number
killed and wounded.2 Across KwaZulu-Natal, the fighting lasted seven days and took the lives of
approximately 100 people, with tens of thousands more left homeless, robbed, or both.
Soberingly, this was only one of many bloody episodes of the extreme political violence
that characterized KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1990s, which itself was constituted only a limited
chapter in an almost two-decade long violent struggle between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF. The
Inkatha leadership obviously organized the raids and attacks seeking to eliminate, or at the very

1

John Aitchison, The Seven Days War: 25-31 March 1990 The victim's narrative, Centre for Adult Education, May
9, 1991, KZN Political Violence, Alan Paton Centre and Struggle Archive, PC126/8/5, 3-5.
2
Aitchison, The Seven Days War, 10-14.
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least intimidate, the opposition. A question remains, however; of why did the men actually doing
the fighting— the Inkatha supporters— get involved? What drove these men to engage in such
extreme violence within their own communities?
Today many mythologically remember the first free and democratic elections in South
Africa in 1994, which ended Apartheid, to be a miracle of non-violence. This popular mythology
also places a united black African majority against the white minority. However, these parts of
the common narrative are partially true at best. While South Africa managed to avoid a feared
race war, political violence still factored into everyday life. The style of political violence in
Kwamnyandu and Gezubuso appeared during the 1980s and early 1990s in what is today,
KwaZulu-Natal. There, a virtual state of civil war once existed, not between the government and
democratic opposition, but between black African movements. The movement that was centered
in much of this violence was the self-styled cultural liberation movement and Zulu nationalist
organization called Inkatha. This thesis will examine this phenomenon of violence and this
movement, and how it relates to a new understanding of the violence of the transition period.
Historical Background
The political violence in the 1980s and 90s in KwaZulu-Natal existed within the wider
history of the struggle against Apartheid in South Africa. In 1948, South Africa entered a new
phase of white minority rule with the ascension of the National Party and their implementation of
Apartheid that only ended with the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994. Apartheid enforced
segregation on the basis of race and constituted a brutal economic domination of black Africans
and forced removal from their homes.3 Under Apartheid, Africans could only legally own land in

3

For the remainder of this thesis, whenever the term “African” is used it should be read as black or black African.
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designated zones called homelands or Bantustans, each designed to house a separate native
ethnic group.4
Additionally, homelands included only around 11% of all land in South Africa and
usually were the worst lands which could not sustain the large populations that were forced to
live on them. 5 This was intentional and also gave South Africa’s white-owned businesses
(primarily mining and agriculture) access to large amounts of cheap, migrant labor. Traditional
leaders, such as chiefs, usually ruled these lands causing some to support Apartheid, while others
were bitterly opposed it.6
This thesis focuses on the predominantly Zulu homeland of KwaZulu, as well as Natal,
the white owned area that surrounded KwaZulu. Today these are joined together as KwaZuluNatal and the region will be referred to as such throughout this thesis. In understanding the
political situation in KwaZulu-Natal, people must comprehend the deep history of the people that
lived there- the Zulu. The Zulu are the largest ethnic group in South Africa and dominated the
region before and during the arrival of the first Europeans. Zulus continued to draw on this
history as did Inkatha, who used Zulu culture, imagery, and history heavily in its politics. The
powerful kingdom formed under the famous King Shaka in the early 1800s, for example, had a
central role. Inkatha’s leadership utilized its ties to the Zulu Royal Family (which continues to
exist) to garner support and legitimacy for the movement.

4

Note that the Apartheid government’s ideas of ethnic groups were complex and often incorrect and did not include
all ethnic groups, gave land to some ethnic groups while others had none, etc.
5
Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Edinburgh: Pearson
Education Limited, 2011), 22-23.
6
Indirect rule through chiefs is in fact a system that predates Apartheid with its own complex history. For more
information and theory on indirect rule, Mahmood Mamdani is an excellent starting point. Mahmood Mamdani,
"Indirect Rule, Civil Society, and Ethnicity: The African Dilemma," Social Justice 23, no. 1/2 (63-64) (1996), 145150.
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Inkatha has a complex history of simultaneously being a Zulu cultural movement, a selfidentified black liberation movement, and eventually a political party.7 Formed in the 1975 by
Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Inkatha was intended to organize the Zulu people and create a
platform for liberation. The banning and forced exile of several liberation movements in the
1960s by the Apartheid regime made Inkatha a crucial movement in the 1970s and early 80s as it
attempted to fill this void. In South Africa, Inkatha is referred to today as the Inkatha Freedom
Party after Africans were legally allowed to form political parties starting in 1990. For the sake
of simplicity, the organization and party will be referred solely as Inkatha. Inkatha’s founder,
Chief Buthelezi is often described by various titles: Gatsha, Doctor, or Chief Minister. He will be
referred to here as Chief Buthelezi. It is important to note that Chief Buthelezi also led the
KwaZulu homeland government (often referred to by its legislative body, the KwaZulu
Assembly) which was predominantly made up of Inkatha members.
Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi started with strong links to the ANC, as shown by Chief
Buthelezi’s participation in the ANC youth league before he founded Inkatha. The organization
adopted ANC slogans, symbols, and tactics. The group initially held fast to its nonviolent ideals
and worked in with the ANC after its exile in 1960 in opposition to the Apartheid state.
The African National Congress or ANC is one of the oldest African liberation
movements and can trace its history all the way back to the 1910s when it was originally known
as the South African Native National Congress. The ANC has throughout its history supported
the extension of rights and liberties to black Africans in South Africa and early on opposed the
1913 Native’s Land Act and homeland system.8 The ANC transitioned to a more mass

Despite Inkatha’s description of itself as a liberation movement, most of its opposition did not share that view.
Instead, the ANC would often call Inkatha reactionary and counter-revolutionary.
8 The 1913 Native’s Land Act is legislation that set the stage for Apartheid. This legislation demarcated limited
areas where the African population could legally own land and helped to cement white ownership of much of South
7
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movement and began to work more co-operatively with the South African Communist Party in
the 1940s.9 In response to Apartheid the ANC began to engage more regularly in civil
disobedience tactics and strikes throughout the 1950s but remained committed to non-violence.
After party leaders were jailed or forced into exile and the Sharpeville massacre in 1960, several
ANC members (particularly the younger and/or communist aligned members) decided that only
through violence would the ANC prevail and began to engage in a guerilla war against the
Apartheid state. Those involved in the violent struggle organized themselves as uMkhonto we
Sizwe (The Spear of the Nation) or MK. The violent struggle became the official policy of the
ANC and MK became the military wing of the ANC. The violent struggle was only ended with
the settlement with the government and resulting free election in 1994.10
Animosity arose between Inkatha and the ANC due to a falling out at a London
conference in 1979-1980. After the fact, Inkatha argued the ANC tried to force Inkatha to
compromise on its adherence to non-violence.11 Some historians have argued that Inkatha sought
to expand its influence in the vacuum the ANC left and opposed being controlled by the ANC in
exile.12 Regardless, this animosity grew into a state of violent conflict with assassinations and
violent attacks being carried out on both sides, although the violence subsided when ANC
activity inside South Africa decreased in the early 1980s.
The primary opponent of Inkatha became the United Democratic Front (UDF), a broad
coalition of liberation movements, labor movements, and everyday people formed in 1983. The

Africa. It also further segregated Indians and Coloureds legally from the white population. Clark and Worger, South
Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 22-23.
9 Clark and Worger, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 26-28.
10 Clark and Worger, South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid, 60-63.
11
KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, “Pietermaritzburg Peace Plan And now will the agony end?”, Clarion
Call, Special Edition, 1988, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCJ2937, 3.
12 Laurence Piper, “Nationalism without a Nation: The rise and fall of Zulu nationalism in South Africa’s transition
to democracy, 1975-1999,” Nations and Nationalism, January 2002, Vol.8.
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UDF’s composition meant that its political platform primarily revolved around ending Apartheid
and implementing a truly non-racial democracy. Since the UDF continued operating in South
Africa during the ANC’s exile, many South Africans viewed it as the successor to, or at least tied
to, the ANC.
This climate changed over time, however. In 1990, the government lifted the ban on
political organizations and the ANC resumed its operations in South Africa and supported the
UDF more directly. This placed the ANC back into more direct conflict with Inkatha. The
ANC/UDF clashed with Inkatha often caused by the younger, more radical nature of their
members as compared to the more conservative, traditionalist focus of Inkatha. ANC/UDF
members frequently accused Inkatha of collaborating with the Apartheid state and instigating
violence. Inkatha responded by accusing comrades (the name for the ANC’s and UDF’s
members) of being little more than criminals and instigating the violence.
Despite Inkatha’s claim to be a nonviolent liberation movement, it often perpetrated
violence in KwaZulu-Natal during these decades of late Apartheid, more than any other
organization.13 The growing influence and differing agenda of the UDF from Inkatha in the mid1980s created a low-intensity civil war in KwaZulu-Natal. Simultaneously, Inkatha cultivated a
close relationship with its professed enemy, the Apartheid State and by the late 1980s, Inkatha
acted as a surrogate for Apartheid state violence.14
Why Inkatha worked with the Apartheid regime has stirred considerable scholarly debate,
but many generally agree that Inkatha felt it needed the government’s support to survive and

13

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, et al, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 3, Chapter 1,
8-10, October 29, 1998, https://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%203.pdf.
14
Because of this whenever Inkatha is referred to as a liberation movement this will be put in quotes or have a
moniker in front of it such as “self-styled.”
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continue its war against the UDF and ANC.15 A symbiotic relationship thus evolved between
Inkatha and the Apartheid government created by Inkatha’s desire for political control over
KwaZulu and the government’s desire to weaken black opposition (UDF and ANC) in the
region. The Apartheid government granted Inkatha greater control over the KwaZulu homeland
in exchange for Inkatha continuing to fight the UDF and ANC. By creating the model “loyal”
homeland, with leaders who were traditional, ethno-nationalist, and deferential to the whiteminority regime, the government achieved its goals including making Inkatha an acceptable
alternative to the ANC for global conservatives.
In exchange for loyalty, South African security forces secretly but directly backed
Inkatha with equipment and training. Inkatha’s decision to collaborate revolved around its
perception that the ANC/UDF constituted the bigger threat, with the underlying logic of “the
enemy of my enemy is my friend.” After the fall of Apartheid, Inkatha discontinued its program
of political violence, and continues to operate as a legitimate political party, though with
considerably less widespread support than it once enjoyed in South Africa or even the KwaZuluNatal region.16
It is finally worth noting the backdrop of much of this violence in South Africa was
during a period of economic decline, largely due to the international disinvestment from South
Africa campaign. Disinvestment was a global protest against Apartheid which started with the
boycott of South African products and grew into calls for large international businesses to pull
out from South Africa. The idea for disinvestment began from ANC protests inside South Africa
in the 1950s but was only largely supported by other African countries whose economies were

15

Stephen Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” Journal of Southern African Studies
24, no. 2 (1998), 261-299.
16
“Election for South African National Assembly,” South Africa, ElectionGuide: Democracy Assistance and
Election News, accessed September 13, 2021, https://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2721/.
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too small to have a real impact on South Africa. In the mid-1980s the United States and several
other western nations signed disinvestment into law which greatly impacted the South African
economy.17 Many regard the international disinvestment campaign as a success which forced the
South African government to negotiate on crucial issues with some even advocating it as the real
reason for the end of Apartheid.
Inkatha was very much opposed to disinvestment due to their ties with the Apartheid
government and belief in free markets and providing jobs to Africans. Inkatha’s outward
declaration was that disinvestment would hinder African growth in South Africa’s economy and
the ANC’s calls for disinvestment were misguided. Inkatha was able to position itself as pro-jobs
while receiving support form big businesses and the Apartheid government.18 Inkatha’s position
on disinvestment will be mentioned as is required throughout this thesis.
Thesis Focus
Inkatha’s direct violence toward other liberation movements despite its professed nonviolent platform reflects an obvious contradiction, that continues to engage scholars. One
question not receiving as much attention is why the supporters of Inkatha engaged in this
violence, particularly when superficially they appear to have had little to gain directly. This
thesis explores how and why Inkatha supporters engaged in violence in KwaZulu-Natal from the
1980s to the 1990s by analyzing the individual factors that motivated them.
These motivating factors exist within three categories: political propaganda, coercion,
and opportunism. Inkatha utilized propaganda highlighting ANC/UDF violence thus providing a
rationale for making them an enemy and supporting Inkatha’s “defensive” violent acts. Inkatha

Richard Knight, “Sanctions, Disinvestment, and U.S. Corporations in South Africa,” in Sanctioning Apartheid,
edited by Robert E. Edgar, (African World Press, 1990).
18 Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1988).
17
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also used propaganda and indoctrination to create loyal cadres of youth and students who were
prepared for violence and act as a counter to growing ANC/UDF influence in the younger
generation. Coercion was also used as a tactic to compel the hesitant into engaging in political
violence. Particularly at the local leader level the use or threat of force installed fear in the local
populace to create support for Inkatha. The stories of those coerced into violence will also be
explored and how their experience questions the monolithic support Inkatha claimed to have.
Finally, opportunism pushed some Inkatha supporters toward violence when it had the potential
to benefit them directly, usually financially, given the dire economic situation in South Africa in
the 1980s and 90s. The desire for personal wealth and status pushed both Inkatha supporters and
leaders towards raiding politically opposed townships and settlements where looting was
common. The economic situation in South Africa at this time also meant that in some cases
violence was necessary to survive as the struggle for resources meant individual Inkatha
supporters committed violence for necessities like groceries. Each of these motivators will be
discussed in turn and explain how individuals reacted to them in the, at times confusing, political
and violent landscape of KwaZulu-Natal.
Finally, the experience of an individual, Daluxolo Luthuli, in Inkatha and the men under
him is used to examine how they reacted to these motivations how it influenced their
participation in intense violence as professional hitmen for Inkatha. Daluxolo and around 200
other men were trained by the Apartheid government to act as a private force for Inkatha and
were known as the Caprivi Operatives or Caprivians. These men’s activities will be explored in
relation to how they operated in both public and memorable conflicts and little known covert
operations. Through the experiences of these men, particularly Daluxolo, their justification of

9

their involvement will be analyzed as well as how the previously described motives effect this
group’s decisions.
The same motivators of propaganda, coercion, and opportunism will be seen in this
highly trained and involved group of men whose profession became one of violence. Their
stories and involvement, particularly in the transition period will also be examined in relation to
their importance both to the troubles and successes of the democratic transition and looming
election in 1994.
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Chapter 1: Historical Literature on Inkatha and Violence in KwaZulu-Natal
Previous scholarship on Inkatha has often focused on three main factors: Inkatha as a
“Third Force,” the ethno-nationalism utilized by Inkatha, and Inkatha’s political motivations.
The “Third Force” generally refers to an outside organization- or “force” which manipulates a
violent situation to their advantage. Here, the Third Force concept argues that a clandestine force
caused the surge in violence in KwaZulu-Natal. Research supports this argument, particularly as
Inkatha’s secret relationship with the Apartheid State was uncovered. Most scholars agree that
the Apartheid state and Inkatha as its surrogate fit the role of the Third Force. To many
historians, Inkatha’s relationship with the Apartheid state has explained the violence perpetrated
by Inkatha and in the KwaZulu-Natal region.
This relationship has been well documented by historians, such as Stephen Ellis, Peter
Stiff, and Daniel Douek, and confirmed by multiple sources.19 Ellis and Stiff led the discussion
on Third Force activities with Ellis highlighting the relationship between certain organizations
like Inkatha and the Apartheid state.20 Before these authors, the idea of a Third Force was
popularized and discussed in Nelson Mandela’s speeches relating to the rise in conflict after
1990. Mandela and others in the ANC suggested that it was a subset of the security forces, not
the Apartheid government as a whole.21 Ellis in his work “The Historical Significance of South
Africa’s Third Force” argues that Third Force activities were not separate from the government
or even a subsection of the government but rather the active policy of the National Party and the

19

Stephen Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” Journal of Southern African Studies
24, no. 2 (1998), 261-299; Peter Stiff, Warfare by Other Means: South Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, (Alberton:
Galago Publishing, 2001); Daniel L. Douek, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa, (London: Hurst and
Company, 2020).
20
Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 262.
21
Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 262. Likely Mandela and other leaders in the
ANC did not push to call Third Force activities express policy of the government because they wanted to maintain
good relations with de Klerk and his peace faction in the government during crucial negotiations.
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Apartheid government. Ellis heavily utilized documents and testimony from the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa which held many of the crucial “Third Force”
hearings and released its final report in 1998, the same year Ellis published his work.
Ellis even contends that the term Third Force is a “misnomer” as it is simply the
government operating in a covert manner.22 Ellis notes that military members making the
necessary actions to aid the Third Force were in constant contact with higher officials in both
military and civilian agencies. Because of this, it would be impossible for the highest echelons of
the government to not know about these activities. Ellis relies on the government’s own
Goldstone Commission into the violence in 1991 as evidence.23 Ellis’ discussion of Inkatha is
comparatively small, but he argues that the government used Inkatha as pawn to help combat the
rising threat to the government posed by the UDF in the late 1980s and through the 1990s.24
Stiff makes a similar argument to Ellis in his work, Warfare by Other Means: South
Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, published in 2001. Stiff emphasizes that the Apartheid
government undeniably knew about the Third Force activities being organized by their security
forces. Stiff goes further, however, by providing more information such as government
documents released during Mandela’s presidency and interviews with former security personnel
that Ellis did not utilize or have access to. This allows Stiff to describe specific events as well as
overall trends and what middle level to high ranking officials hoped to achieve. This analysis of
the bureaucracy and goals of the Apartheid state explains the role of Inkatha as a Third Force.25
Stiff looks at similar examples of Inkatha Third Force activity as Ellis (such as the Caprivi
Operatives and the Trust Feed Massacre), but he provides a much more an in depth analysis of

Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 262-263.
Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 263-264.
24 Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 274-276.
25 Stiff, Warfare by Other Means, 156-183.
22
23

12

these cases as well as how local low level security officials operated extensively and without
informing the higher levels of government. Additionally, Stiff begins a limited effort to discuss
the agency or motivation of those operating under the Apartheid state security forces (such as
Inkatha members).26
Other scholars have more recently joined the conversation. In Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency in South Africa, Douek focuses on Third Force violence during the transition
period in South Africa in the early 1990s. Writing in 2020, Douek provides the most robust and
intriguing argument about the extent of Third Force activities and the Apartheid security state’s
involvement. He goes beyond linking Inkatha (and other operatives and organizations) to the
Apartheid state and argues that Military and Security Branch members established parallel
structures and loyalties within the government.
In some ways Douek undermines Ellis and Stiff’s arguments that the government knew
and controlled the activities of its security branch. Instead, Douek describes the immense ability
of the security branch to conceal the full extent of its operations and its ability to evade
oversight. This ensured when other sections of government became aware of security branch
activities, they lacked a full understanding and typically proved powerless or unwilling to reign it
in.
Douek also argues that this securocrat shadow government used Third Force violence
not only to try and curb the ANC but to hold onto power to spoil any democratic elections. Thus,
government factions were actively trying to subvert President F. W. de Klerk and members of his
“peace faction” with Douek arguing some diehard members of the “shadow government”

26

Stiff, Warfare by Other Means, 180-193.
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considered a coup.27 In contrast, Ellis largely rejected the notion of an organized coup.28 While
Douek’s discussion of Inkatha had more examples and analysis of these events, his arguments
largely parallel Ellis and Stiff. Each author provided a through discussion on the motivations of
the Apartheid state and some Inkatha leadership (largely meaning Chief Buthelezi) motivations
but with little review of what motivated individuals in Inkatha.
Similarly, some historians, such as S. Nombuso Dlamini, in her work “The Construction,
Meaning and Negotiation of Ethnic Identities in KwaZulu-Natal” published in 1998,
concentrated on the “Zulu-ness” of Inkatha to explain its role as an ethno-nationalist group.
Dlamini stresses the importance of the ethno-nationalism of Inkatha as a motivation for the
violence. This in-group/out-group style thinking predates the late Apartheid era conflict in
KwaZulu, but it continued to be utilized by Inkatha. To this end “Zulu-ness” can be seen as both
a manufactured rationale and also a preexisting cultural thought process that had created violent
opposition between Inkatha and their opponents.29
Gerhard Maré and John Wright have posed a similar argument in “Ethnicity, Society and
Conflict in Natal” published in 1994. They contend Inkatha capitalized on separating themselves
into a separate ethnic group and argued that Inkatha narrowed the definition of what a Zulu was
into a political alignment. Mare and Wright described this definition as “ethnic bourgeois in
alliance with big capital” and Inkatha targeted those outside this mold.30
Their argument does not recognize Inkatha had a mass support beyond the bourgeoise
class, and Inkatha made frequent concessions to mobilize labor. Furthermore, while ethnicity

27

Douek, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa, 73-100.
Ellis, “The Historical Significance of South Africa's Third Force,” 262.
29
S. Nombuso Dlamini, “The construction, meaning and negotiation of ethnic identities in KwaZulu-Natal,” Social
Identities, October 1998, Vol. 4.
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affected Inkatha’s popularity and violent actions, it was not the sole reason for the violence of
the 1980s and 90s, particularly in the case of KwaZulu-Natal. The ethno-nationalist nature of
Inkatha was not absolute as many Zulus also participated in the ANC and UDF. Inkatha’s focus
on ethnicity better explains urban violence in areas like Pretoria, Johannesburg, and surrounding
townships. Large groups of ethnic Zulu migratory workers housed in hostels in non-Zulu
majority areas created tensions along ethnic lines which exploded into ethnic violence.
Gary Kynoch expertly covers this understanding of violence in his book Township
Violence and the End of Apartheid: War on the Reef published in 2018. Kynoch focuses on the
violence on the Reef (areas around Johannesburg) and aptly covers the motivators of ethnicity
and belonging in this multicultural setting.31 This thesis will apply a similar methodology by
looking at individual cases and factors as Kynoch does, but in the region of KwaZulu-Natal. In
KwaZulu-Natal, most Africans belong to the Zulu ethnic group making ethnicity a much smaller
factor. Instead, different conclusions must be drawn to the cause of violence. Outside of
Kynoch’s discussion on ethnicity as a factor, he discusses what motivated individuals (or at least
the large number of Inkatha supporters as opposed to the few leaders). This thesis will take a
similar approach to understanding violence but localized to KwaZulu-Natal. Like Kynoch’s
work, a case study will be utilized that encapsulates the argument and points of this thesis.
However, the focus in this case study will be on a static group of people, as opposed to a specific
locale as Kynoch does.
Other historians, such Gerhard Maré, Georgina Hamilton, and Chris Lowe, have looked
at the motives of Inkatha’s leadership, namely Chief Buthelezi, as an explanation for the
violence. Chief Buthelezi is a figure who was at the center of South African politics and
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historiography in the 1980s and 90s.32 Maré, an influential historian in South Africa’s later
Apartheid history, was among the first and most prolific writers about Inkatha specifically. His
and Hamilton’s work, An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi’s Inkatha and South Africa published in
1998, has set the stage for this thesis with his top down approach to Inkatha and their motives.
This top down approach has proven that Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha are inseparable, and Chief
Buthelezi was undeniably a driving force in Inkatha policy. Chief Buthelezi’ cult of personality
cannot be ignored in order to have any serious discussion about Inkatha.33 Maré has also
effectively argued for the motivations of Inkatha’s leadership in the framework of Apartheid as a
whole and in key areas like homeland governance, disinvestment, and collaboration with the
State.34 This top down approach does not, however, explain the motives of Inkatha’s numerous
followers and why they chose to engage in violence.
Chris Lowe has focused even more closely on Chief Buthelezi and has come to many of
the same conclusions as Maré on his motivations in his work, “Buthelezi, Inkatha, and the
Problem of Ethnic Nationalism in South Africa” published in 1990. Lowe dives into Chief
Buthelezi’s role in homeland governance and his cultural role in Zulu society as explanations for
Inkatha policy.35 For these reasons, Chief Buthelezi will be discussed throughout this thesis, but
counter to these authors, he will not act as a stand in for the motivations of Inkatha as a whole.
While Chief Buthelezi is an influential figure, he is but one part of Inkatha’s propaganda
apparatus which will be discussed at length in this thesis. Furthermore, the motivations of one
man do not adequately explain why others fight for him or on his behalf.
32
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Still others, such as Laurence Piper in his work, “Nationalism without a Nation: The rise
and fall of Zulu nationalism in South Africa’s transition to democracy” published in 2002,
explored Inkatha through the lens of political science. Piper explores how violence evolved from
political motives and became a viable strategy to achieve the organization's political goals.
Violence was an effective method of controlling territory and the people on that territory. These
were both crucial for Inkatha to extract the necessary money, manpower, and above all voting
support it needed in the transition era.36 However, these political factors did not always motivate
(or even occur to) those that directly participated in the violence and this analysis often falls into
the same trap of limiting the focus to the leadership of Inkatha.
Almost all of this previous scholarship takes a top-down approach that often does not
consider the individuals needed to operationalize violence. This study joins a growing number of
scholars seeking to understand the nature of political violence through previously unconsidered
factors, such as Jill Kelly, who has focused on land and intrapersonal relationships in her work
To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996 published
in 2018.37 Similar to these new approaches to Inkatha and the complex narratives in South Africa
during this period, this thesis will adopt a view “from below,” paying close attention to
individual rationales while maintaining how these relate to the broader organization of Inkatha.
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Chapter 2: Political Propaganda and Indoctrination
“They would talk about peace, but covertly they would be speaking about violence”- Daluxolo
Luthuli
Relatively little has been written about Inkatha’s use of propaganda besides Inkatha’s
education system Ubuntu (this will be discussed later in this chapter). What has been written
about Inkatha’s utilization of propaganda is often limited to discussions on the utilization of
ethno-nationalism. For example, scholars will stress Zulu culture, Zulu history, and Zulu imagery
as used by Inkatha.38 These discussions of Inkatha’s education program also have a tendency to
solely focus on the Zulu cultural aspect of the education, however there is a more diverse
historiography in this particular area.39 While Inkatha utilized all of these and more, this
argument fails similarly to pervious scholarly works mentioned which characterized Inkatha as a
monolithic Zulu organization that all Zulus adhered to.
Past scholarship in this area only begins to discuss propaganda in a more nuanced way
when analyzing Chief Buthelezi’s speeches. While Chief Buthelezi’s speeches are important as
he is the leader of Inkatha and the KwaZulu homeland government they are only part of the
whole. Chief Buthelezi was (perhaps unsurprisingly in hindsight) shrewd enough to not outright
state his position, particularly in the case of violence. Chief Buthelezi was also well versed in the
art of spin. For example, he claimed that Inkatha is the successor to the ANC-in-exile while at
the same time denouncing the ANC for their armed struggle against the Apartheid government
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all in the same speech without losing coherence.40 His speeches can thus often not stand on their
own and must be considered in a wider context (with a few rare exceptions).
This thesis will begin by looking at how Inkatha used propaganda to motivate its
supporters and justify the use of violence to them. This was primarily achieved by pushing the
cause of violence onto their political opponents and defending any actions by Inkatha fighters as
justified self-defense. The utilization of propaganda saw widespread use by Inkatha as conflict
escalated and continued to rage between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF in the 1980s. The
organization moved quickly to present its side of the story and construct an oft-repeated narrative
that sought to explain the violence and push the blame away from themselves.
Inkatha’s Propaganda Apparatus
Inkatha had a relatively robust apparatus to engage in its propaganda work and seemed to
understand the important role of propaganda in the confusing atmosphere of violence and
competing ideologies in KwaZulu-Natal. Precisely because KwaZulu-Natal was majority one
ethnic group (for Africans) and a hotbed for many kinds of political activity made Inkatha’s
propaganda and arguments therein all the more important. By studying Inkatha’s propaganda and
attacks we get a window into understanding why people were motived to participate in the
Inkatha cause.
Inkatha utilized the KwaZulu homeland government heavily to give its message
legitimacy and reach. The KwaZulu Ministry of Communications acted as a mouthpiece for
Inkatha and the media it produced will be discussed at length in this chapter (particularly its
periodical Clarion Call). Additionally, Inkatha realized that for its propaganda and political
messaging to have the most impact, it had to control the medium that reached the most people.
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That is why Inkatha chairman Oscar Dhlomo bought out the Zulu language newspaper Ilanga.41
Ilanga was (and still is) one of the most widely read newspapers in South Africa. As a Zulu
language paper (at one point the only Zulu language paper) it had the exact demographic Inkatha
wanted to reach.
The buyout of Ilanga was not a complete propaganda victory because Dhlomo and
Inkatha were faced with opposition from the existing staff on the paper who went on strike and
condemnation from several other newspapers. This brought national attention to the sale and
criticism that Dhlomo along with the rest of Inkatha was going to transform the paper into a
“political rag.”42 Dhlomo and Chief Buthelezi countered claims by other newspapers by stating
that the buyout should be celebrated as a “black coup” over white-owned media and stated their
goal of maintaining journalistic integrity in Ilanga.43 In response the striking workers and other
newspapers were quick to ask- why else would a political organization attempt to buy out a
widely circulated newspaper if they did not intend to use it for themselves? All the workers that
continued the strike were eventually fired or rejoined the newspaper. The positions of the fired
workers were filled by writers from the KwaZulu Ministry of Communications and, against the
previous promises of Dhlomo and Chief Buthelezi, the first issue under their control immediately
displayed overwhelming support for Inkatha. On top of this an editorial and ad for writers
wanted in the first issue tried to spin the issue as Inkatha and the paper providing jobs.44
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Despite the opposition, Inkatha remained in control of the paper (even contemporarily
Inkatha owns a stake in the newspaper) and had access to its large number of readers.45 Inkatha’s
ability to recognize and control a critical medium shows a certain awareness of propaganda that
is not often afforded to Inkatha. The deception, shrewdness, and nuance used in their attempt to
control the narrative was not unique to the battle over Ilanga. The argument and methods used
by Inkatha were recuring and will be put in focus throughout this chapter.
In the late 1980s, the KwaZulu homeland government appointed the Inkatha Institute to
investigate the problem of violence in the region and its causes. This organization claimed to be
independent and non-partisan, but was clearly politically aligned with Inkatha, as noted by its
contemporary detractors.46 The Inkatha Institute was another mouthpiece for Inkatha but this
time staking its legitimacy in the supposed impartiality of academia and think tanks. This was
likely to counter criticism Inkatha was facing from academics who frequently aligned with the
UDF. The Inkatha Institute carried out its own study and came to the conclusion that the violence
was perpetrated by unemployed and rebellious youth, referred to as comrades (the term used by
ANC/UDF supporters). In describing these youths, the Inkatha Institute stated, “They kill
political persons indiscriminately but also indulge in murdering ordinary people in the
townships.”47 Furthermore, the youth were described as an “onslaught,” against the general
public and communities were simply fighting back against an unwanted invasion by these
comrades. Here, Inkatha did two things which were subtle but effective.

Sapa, “Ilanga owners accuse strikers,” Independent Online, 04/11/2012, https://www.iol.co.za/businessreport/companies/ilanga-owners-accuse-strikers-1273901; As the article shows the paper’s owner and purpose
appears to be in flux.
46
Carmel Rickard, “John Aitcheson on KwaZulu-Natal Violence Statistics,” May 3, 1990, Carmel Rickard Cassette
Donation, Killie Campbell Africana Library.
47
KwaZulu Ministry of Communications, “Pietermaritzburg Peace Plan And now will the agony end?”, Clarion
Call, Special Edition, 1988, Killie Campbell Africana Library, KCJ2937, 10
45

21

Firstly, Inkatha stated the target of the comrades was the community and it was motivated
by economics and gang warfare. This made the comrades seem motivated by personal gain and
affected by the deteriorating economy of South Africa. This is intended to give the reader the
impression that the UDF and its supporters did not truly have a political motive or platform.
Even if they did, one of their major pillars- disinvestment- was only worsening the economy and
this worsening economy caused the upsurge in violence. Inkatha had creatively painted the UDF
as both the cause and perpetrators of violence. Secondly, it gave Inkatha an opportunity to
expand its support. By characterizing itself and the community as equally affected, Inkatha
presented the idea that a joint effort to fight against the UDF was a logical progression to stop the
violence. This assertion was aided by the fact that ANC/UDF membership and supporters were
largely radical youth who wished to rebel against traditional norms. Inkatha was making an
appeal to traditional ideals and preserving a conservative version of the community. Through this
claim, Inkatha additionally suggested that either the violence was being directly perpetrated by
the ANC/UDF or that these youths were motivated by them and could not be controlled by the
leadership of these organizations.
Indeed, a spokesperson for the Inkatha Institute said as much when he described the
violence being committed by comrades, and Inkatha continued to directly attack various leaders
of the UDF for sponsoring or encouraging violence.48 In effect, Inkatha sought to again tarnish
the motives of the UDF and its members. This explanation and characterization of the violence
became part of the Inkatha party line and was repeated frequently in speeches, press interviews,
in party periodicals, and by sympathetic news outlets. Inkatha, of course, provided the remedy to
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these problems later in this same periodical with articles on their own union, UWUSA (which
was anti-disinvestment and “pro jobs”) and Inkatha’s “Peace Plan.”49
By placing the blame for the initiation of violence on the ANC and UDF, Inkatha was
better able to explain their involvement as reactive, and therefore justified. This was especially
important as Inkatha officials and members were increasingly implicated in violence during the
mid-1980s.50 Inkatha could not overtly claim responsibility for these members and support their
actions publicly because it ran counter to Inkatha’s platform as an ostensibly non-violent
organization. The organization skirted this issue by stating that violence committed by its
members was justified when it was in self-defense. They had already begun using this argument
in tandem with the Inkatha Institute report, which claimed that communities were acting in selfdefense against the violent youth.51
Chief Buthelezi's position as both a traditional and political leader meant his words had
power and as such defended Inkatha’s position by stating, “We reserve the right to defend our
persons and our property against the onslaughts which are now being mounted against us.”52
This allowed Inkatha to maintain its platform of non-violence (of a sort) while also providing a
way to legitimize the violence its supporters committed. This became a cemented part of Inkatha
policy as both its leadership and supporters started to use the phrase, “A political eye for an eye
and a political tooth for a tooth,” which became increasingly popular in the late 1980s and
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continued into the 1990s (in effect, the word political was only used for propaganda, and the
phrase was largely shortened to just “an eye for an eye”).53
The mantra of an “eye for an eye” and its line of thinking provided an avenue for Inkatha
leadership to indirectly encourage the commission of violent acts and for Inkatha supporters to
justify their violent actions. While the phrase was probably initially intended to relate to political
rhetoric and policy actions, it quickly became related to politically motivated violence as well.
An example of this line of thinking can be seen when Inkatha Youth Brigade members
were pressured by journalists in 1988 to describe their ideas of self-defense. The Youth Brigade
members had a much looser idea than, for example, the legal definition. “An eye for an eye,” in
the way that these Inkatha Youth Brigade members described it, meant that the defense of honor
and status was of extreme importance.54 For example, a verbal sleight by a political opponent
against Chief Buthelezi could be grounds for physical violence to some Inkatha members (and
this exact scenario would play out more than once). The idea of “an eye for an eye” also meant to
supporters that they were justified if they wanted to get even. For example, if an Inkatha member
was killed by a UDF supporter, Inkatha could feel justified in wanting to kill this man, or any
other UDF supporter, and define it as a form of defense.55 This only contributed to the cycle of
violence that plagued KwaZulu-Natal.
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Ubuntu and Indoctrination
After black school children led the Soweto Uprising in 1976, it became clear to all groups
and organizations involved in South Africa that the youth would have an extensive role to play.56
Inkatha was no exception to this and moved quickly to integrate young people into the “cultural
liberation movement” and later the party (as seen in the Youth Brigade mentioned above).
Additionally, Inkatha used its wide powers inside KwaZulu to educate children according to their
principles and indoctrinate them along Inkatha’s party line. Inkatha developed its own syllabus
called Ubuntu in early 1978 and began to implement it later that year.57 Besides its obvious slant
towards Zulu nationalism and its pro-Inkatha nature, the outline for the syllabus rather innocently
included classes on community, health, history, and religious studies.58 A closer look at the exact
contents of the syllabus and how it was to be implemented in the troubled times of the 1980s
reveals a much different story.
In information produced about the Inkatha syllabus, the KwaZulu Department of
Education and Culture stated that the “syllabus is not static” and that it must conform to “the
aims and objectives of the National Cultural Liberation Movement” (meaning Inkatha).59 This
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point is doubly stressed as the document states, “many adults seem to hold divergent beliefs
about Inkatha…. These are passed on to the young and cloud the youth’s minds. This
syllabus…will clear many doubts and thus create unified ideas to match with the goals of
Inkatha.”60 Inkatha clearly intended to use this syllabus to combat opposing views on the
organization and targeted children specifically for political education and indoctrination.
Furthermore, the content of the syllabus demonstrates the true motives of Inkatha with its
politically charged history and traditionally focused community classes. The history sections of
the syllabus focused on the importance of ethnic Zulus in South African history and placed
Inkatha center stage in the struggle against Apartheid. Little mention is given to other liberation
movements unless they are portrayed through a pro-Inkatha lens. For example, the ANC only
receives brief mention, and the focus is on Albert Luthuli, a Zulu, heading the organization until
his death. The ANC-in-exile is largely omitted and Inkatha is portrayed as the successor to
Luthuli’s ANC.
The syllabus also placed Chief Buthelezi in the same context as that of King Shaka and
other influential Zulu leaders, even though he was already seen as a controversial figure during
this period.61 Students were also taught war cries and Inkatha songs, which became increasingly
politically charged as the organization used them at rallies and other events, often leading to
violence.62 All students had to learn and perform these songs regardless of whether or not they
agreed with their content. Similarly, teachers were required to teach the syllabus regardless of
their personal beliefs.63 The syllabus also increased its focus on political education for students
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as they aged, focusing on the greatness of Inkatha and installing “Inkatha discipline.”64 Similarly,
students were encouraged to join the Inkatha Youth Brigade and participate in their events.
Students were also taught self-defense, a term with a debated definition as explained above.65
Tensions arose from both students and teachers who did not agree with the syllabus, in
whole or in part. Particularly in the 1980s, the syllabus became a point of conflict due to the
political nature of its contents, adding more fuel to the fire of unrest already present in schools in
South Africa during this period. Schools became battlegrounds as Inkatha Youth Brigade
members fought their fellow classmates, who were often organized in youth and student
organizations aligned with the UDF. Inkatha officials denied that acts of violence were
committed by Inkatha Youth Brigade members, and instead often described these events as the
Youth Brigade “maintaining the peace.”66 Inkatha and the KwaZulu Assembly (KwaZulu
homeland government) briefly considered giving teachers guns to enforce the peace in schools,
but the idea was ultimately shut down.67
A pamphlet, possibly authored by an Inkatha Youth Brigade member or supporter, was
produced and spread in KwaMashu concerning the violence in schools and was directed largely
towards parents.68 The pamphlet claims that a separate group of unruly students were the cause
of the violence in the area, and they acted in accordance with groups like the UDF and ANC. The
pamphlet blames these students for theft, looting, and killing, and charges that these students are
an affront to “the Nation” and family values.69 The pamphlet pleads with parents to maintain
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their traditional authority and closes with a call for the community to arm themselves and “beat
up” these students and their allies. This call to action was followed by a list of names and
addresses directly calling out those they deem to be “provokers of violence”.70
Children were also indoctrinated outside of schools through the organization’s use of
youth camps. These camps were open to both Youth Brigade members as well as the general
Zulu youth population in KwaZulu (the camps were later opened to all Africans). The youth
camps date back to the late 1970s, but their role changed over the course of the 1980s.71 Like
many of Inkatha’s policies and organizations, the youth camps started innocently enough,
described as a way to uplift the local population and encourage them to support the goals of
Inkatha as a cultural liberation movement. To this end, the youth camps taught and promoted
skills in agriculture, trades, construction, etc.72 Chief Buthelezi and Inkatha promoted these
camps as an answer for unemployment and a way for the youth to be productive even if they had
left school, were forced to abandon their education, or were otherwise unable to learn. This
description and justification for the camps remained from the camps’ inception through the
1980s and worked well with Inkatha’s arguments that economic woes were the cause of
violence. Additionally, by characterizing its youth as disciplined and forward thinking, Inkatha
had another useful tool to attack the “unruly” youth of the UDF.73
Despite talks of ending unemployment and raising up the youth, Inkatha’s youth camps,
as well as the Youth Brigade itself, started to organize themselves on paramilitary lines. One
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reporter quoted that, “members of the movement addressed each other as comrade, that
subcommittees of the central committee looked into things like defense and security, [and] that
military-type uniforms were worn.”74 The article also notes the worry of an Apartheid State
official at this militant development and how Inkatha should maintain its professed policy of
non-violence.75 Despite these claims, the future would prove the article to be wrong on both
accounts. Firstly, the state official need not worry- Inkatha’s main enemy was not the Apartheid
State, but instead the UDF. Secondly, Inkatha youth supporters were not a force for peace, but
directly engaged in violence against the UDF increasingly throughout the 1980s.
The organization of the youth into a paramilitary force was a direct response to school
boycotts and student riots from 1978 to 1980. Fearful of radical youth not aligned with the
organization, Inkatha created these camps and put greater focus on the Youth Brigade. These
youths were trained as “warriors” and Chief Buthelezi stated that, “[they] were to be trained to
maintain the peace and eradicate bad elements in the black community.”76 As with talks of “selfdefense” and “eye for an eye,” “maintaining the peace” and “eradicat[ing] bad elements” should
be read as euphemisms for violence and justifications for the actions of the Inkatha Youth
Brigade and members of these youth camps.
Political propaganda was a useful tool for Inkatha to justify its position on violence to
fence-sitters and particularly to its supporters. By giving a pretext or rationale for the use of
violence, Inkatha believed it could avoid scrutiny and circumvent any potential backlash from its
supporters. Furthermore, this allowed Inkatha supporters to be more comfortable engaging in
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violence, and perhaps even encouraged other supporters who had not previously taken part in
violence on Inkatha’s behalf to do so. Inkatha found propaganda to be a particularly useful tool
for youth, who they could indoctrinate. Through the Inkatha Youth Brigade, Inkatha syllabus,
and Inkatha youth camps, the organization was able to create a cadre of dedicated supporters and
fighters. However, Inkatha could not always convince everyone through propaganda, and in
those cases, they relied on coercion.
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Chapter 3: Coercion
Sticks, Stones, and Threats
On October 9th, 1987, the silence of the night was broken by group of armed men
pounding on the door of the main hut of the Mkhize residence in Mpumuza, a rural area outside
Pietermaritzburg. The men were led by David Ntombela a local induna (headman) and Inkatha
chairman.77 He wanted to see the older brothers of the Mkhize family, Mandla, Mangethe, and
Mntu who (fortunately for them) were not home at the time.78 Ntombela was angered that the
older brothers had been refusing to come to Inkatha meetings and rallies and refusing to pay their
dues to Inkatha.79 After searching all the huts on and around the Mkhize kraal, Ntombela and his
men turned to leave and the Mkhize family returned to their huts to go to sleep. Ntombela either
changed his mind or waited until the Mkhize family was caught off guard and turned around.
The mother of the Mkhize family was outside her hut when Ntombela and his men quickly
returned. Ntombela told the mother of the family to lean against the wall then shot her. The men
with Ntombela quickly burst into the secondary hut killing the eldest sister. The rest of the
family ran for their lives into the bush or to neighbors’ houses. Ntombela and his men then left
satisfied that the Mkhize family had gotten the message.80
This story and those like it played out frequently across the Natal midlands in the 1980s.
Threats of violence kept the local population in line and failure to support Inkatha came with
very real consequences as seen in the Mkhize family’s case. Similar coercive activities can often
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be seen at the local leader level, wherein a local chief, headman, Induna (plural iziNduna) or
other influential leader used his power over those under him to force them to join Inkatha and
engage in violence on Inkatha’s behalf. Another example of this can be seen in the 1987
indictment brought against Christopher Zuma, an Inkatha official and local leader near
Pietermaritzburg, by another family, also with the last name Mkhize (no relation). Zuma
consistently abused his position of power to harass and threaten local families into joining
Inkatha. Those that did not join faced beatings or murder, not only of themselves, but also their
relatives. Zuma also used the theft of property, particularly the stealing of cattle, to coerce those
under him. These same tactics were used by Zuma to force these unwitting supporters to engage
in violence.81
One witness and victim, Mxolisi Hadebe testifies, “I was told that they were recruiting
members for Inkatha and that those who did not join would be assaulted. I was also told if I did
not join my house would be burnt. As a result of these threats, I said that I was willing to join
Inkatha even though this was untrue.”82 Other witnesses of the indictment testified that they or
others they knew were forced to join “raiding parties” which targeted supporters or sympathizers
of Inkatha’s main political rival, the UDF. One of the applicants explained that he was a previous
supporter of Inkatha, but the recent acts of violence led to his desire to revoke his membership.
He was worried, however, that his lack of support for these violent acts and his wish to leave
Inkatha would make him a target, and he feared for his family’s safety.83
Another common method Inkatha used to coerce its supporters into violence was by
forcing them to take part in rallies. Particularly in the mid to late 1980s, Inkatha bused its
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supporters into areas largely controlled by its political opponents and provoked conflict. These
bused-in supporters were forced into a hostile environment and encouraged to fight on Inkatha’s
behalf. In an interview with reporter Carmel Rickard, two young Inkatha supporters recalled
such a situation immediately after it happened to them. The two young men, one 18 and the other
19, explained they had no intention of engaging in violence and did not even suspect that they
would be forced to fight. They were told that they were bused to Lamontville for the memorial
service of someone who had died there. They were not given any further information and were
wildly unprepared for the violent situation they were unwittingly placed into. The young men
noted that others around them were armed with spears and shields. Initially, they did not think
much of this, as it is part of the Zulu custom to carry these traditional weapons at ceremonies.
However, looking back on the situation, they noted it was clear these men were prepared for
conflict.
After the service, the two young men related that they were told to march through
Lamontville, but they were met with resistance not long after entering the township. Several of
the residents (likely UDF supporters) threw stones at the Inkatha supporters as they began their
march, and things quickly turned into a violent street brawl. The two young men stated that they
were frightened and ran. After running and hiding for most of the night they met an Inkatha
official who stopped them from walking home. He ordered them to go back and fight. He told
them to pick up stones and the scared young men initially agreed until they found a moment to
run from him too.84
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What these young men described is an episode in a wider event that would be known as
the Lamontville Crisis, which began in 1984. Inkatha wanted to exert greater control over
Lamontville by incorporating it into KwaZulu, but the residents resisted, creating violent clashes.
These young men, as stated in the interview, obviously had no idea of the wider implications of
why they were in Lamontville until it was too late. By obfuscating the purpose of their presence
in Lamontville and forcing their supporters into a situation of violence, Inkatha’s actions
demonstrate a clear example of coercion. Additionally, the unnamed Inkatha official exerted a
more direct form of coercion when he used his status to order the young men to go back and
fight. This stated example, however, was not a unique occurrence.
An Institute for Black Research report on violence in Natal in 1985 contains a case which
also took place during a rally in the midst of the Lamontville Crisis. In an interview with a
resident of Umlazi, an Inkatha stronghold, the resident described how he was forced to go to
Lamontville and engage in violence. The resident reported that around 100 armed Inkatha
supporters came and forced him from a friend’s home. He and others were forced to take up
sticks or whatever weapons were available and go to the Umlazi stadium. Once at the stadium,
he reports that, “We were then ordered to drink as much sorghum beer as our stomachs could
take.”85 Afterwards a local Inkatha official, Winnington Sabelo, arrived and gave a speech
calling on them to march on Lamontville and “kill everything including cats and rats. He said he
was going to point out the houses which should be destroyed.”86
The interviewed man says he then managed to leave the group, as they were very drunk,
but he subsequently witnessed the group robbing houses and stealing property. Anyone who
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resisted was severely beaten, some sustaining seemingly mortal wounds from spears. In some
cases, even those that had their things stolen from them were forced to join the marauding group
spreading violence further throughout the township. Inkatha leaders, such as Sabelo, made it a
practice to force supporters to engage in violence, threatening their person or property if they did
not comply. Additionally, everyone was ordered to drink beer until drunk, indicating that Inkatha
used alcohol to induce the support and obedience of the men while also facilitating them towards
violence.87
Incidents similar to those above continued throughout the 1980s and 1990s and were in
no way limited to the Lamontville Crisis. A man named Mshyeni Ndovu gave a statement of
how he was forced to participate in an Inkatha rally in the mid 1980s. Like the Umlazi resident
above, Ndovu recounts how he was told to grab a stick and follow other armed Inkatha men led
by Mandla Shabalala. Ndovu describes how he was threatened with a beating if he did not
comply. Ndovu stated that, “anyone who refused to come along was beaten with sticks by certain
people who appeared to be in charge.”88 He was then forced onto a bus with several others armed
with sticks and various traditional weapons. Ndovu and the bus eventually ended up in Congella.
Ndovu makes it clear that once he got off the bus, he was going to be expected to fight, which
worried him greatly. Once the bus started to arrive in Congella, people (presumably UDF
supporters) started to stone the bus. Someone shot at the bus and Ndovu was struck in the arm
and stomach and was later taken to the hospital.89 Ndovu managed to avoid being forced into
fighting in a street brawl typical of Inkatha rallies at this time but only at great personal cost to
his health, and not by choice.
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Besides these examples of rallies that were engineered to cause violence, people were
coerced into violence in “everyday” settings, often close to the homes of the victims and
perpetrators. A collection of statements from various people affected by Inkatha’s violence from
the township of Newcastle describes some of this “everyday” violence and the coercive tactics
used to achieve it. By simply refusing to participate in Inkatha activities, the Dlamini family had
unknowingly made themselves targets and an example to others who might think of retracting
their support. Dudu-Zile Dlamini recounts how his family was targeted by a local leader and
Inkatha official, resulting in the death of the father of the family and one of the brothers. DuduZile testified that:
I think there were a number of reasons why we were attacked. First of all, my mother was
an Inkatha member for a while but then decided to leave. She said she was not satisfied
with the organization. Secondly, at a certain time there were a number of vigilantes
moving around the township looking for men who would join their mob. They wanted
my father to join but he decided not to participate.90

Even those who were supporters of Inkatha were often forced to engage in potentially
violent situations. One such supporter was a civil servant for KwaZulu, who was forced to
participate in a march from the capital of KwaZulu, Ulundi. Inkatha youths and KwaZulu police
working for Inkatha forced several groups of people to join the march. The civil servant was not
told where they were going or how long the march would be. The nature of the march was
clearly hostile, as members were armed and held signs with slogans attacking political enemies
of Inkatha. At one point, someone attempted to leave the marching column but was immediately
attacked and stoned by youths (possibly Inkatha Youth Brigade members). Another person was
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injured but was forced to keep marching. The civil servant broke her ankle and was allowed to
leave before seeing the conclusion of the march.91
Inkatha vigilantes also took advantage of dire situations among those living in the urban
and semi-urban areas of what is today, KwaZulu-Natal. Vigilantes was the name often given to
Inkatha supporters who attacked comrades, usually in these settings. The term vigilantes came
from the belief that they were merely attacking criminals, as Inkatha had labeled comrades as
such. Reports show that these vigilantes often ran protection rackets for those without permanent
housing (often referred to as squatters). Furthermore, the squatters complained that the vigilantes
forcefully recruited members and instead of offering protection, they often forced these recruited
members to join in on attacks on Inkatha’s political opponents in other parts of the township.92
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Chapter 4: Opportunistic Violence and the Struggle to Survive
Raids, Looting, and War
Coercion was clearly a major factor in Inkatha sponsored or directed violence in
KwaZulu-Natal, however many Inkatha supporters did not have to be coerced. Instead, the
promise of loot, payment, and/or status lead Inkatha supporters to choose to engage in violence
out of their own volition. It is perhaps unsurprising that so many would kill and attack for gain
rather than be faced with violence if they did not.
Inkatha supporters had used violence for personal gain since the beginning of the 1980s
and often looted and stole when they engaged in various kinds of violence and killings on
Inkatha’s behalf. By the mid to late 1980s, not only did the violence grow, but so did the number
of lootings and thefts. In part, this was caused by the economic downturn experienced in South
Africa in the mid-1980s. Slowed economic growth, in addition to sanctions and divestment from
major countries and corporations in the West lead to large unemployment and economic
instability that South Africa has never truly recovered from.93 Subsequently, engaging in
violence for personal economic gain became more appealing and more prevalent among Inkatha
supporters. Additionally, because of the economic stagnation some participated more out of
desperation. The desire for basic goods could push Inkatha supporters to violence in a variety of
instances. This situation was most apparent in the direct theft and looting that occurred wherever
Inkatha leadership organized acts of violence, most commonly called raids.
Raids were an effective tool for Inkatha to deal with their opponents, but also proved to
be opportunities for Inkatha supporters to personally benefit. Looting was a common occurrence
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in Inkatha fighting, as seen in the above example of the Umlazi man forced to participate in a
raid where looting had a prevalent role. Looting, in this case, could be interpreted as a form of
payment for participation and a potential tool for attracting more supporters to the Inkatha cause.
The interviewed Umlazi resident noted that groceries were a prime target for looting. He
stated, “I also observed that members of Sabelo’s group were moving from house to house
robbing people of their property and especially groceries. Any resistance was mercilessly
crushed.”94 The perceived value of such everyday items indicates the severe impact the economic
downturn had at the time and gives further credence to the idea of looting as a necessary- or at
least deeply motivating- action for these participants. Furthermore, the Umlazi resident noted
that, “even the people from whom the groceries had been taken…were not taken to the police
station. Instead, they were ordered to join the group, so that they moved around in the townships
terrorizing the residents.”95 Evidently, even those that did not want to be there or were even
directly affected by the violence still participated in the looting.
The Seven Days War, which was described in the introduction of this thesis,
encompasses the most accounts of looting occurring during a single event. These seven days of
intense violence saw organized Inkatha supporters attack their UDF opponents in the rural and
semi-urban areas around Pietermaritzburg from approximately March 24/25 to March 31, 1990
(however, fighting continued in some areas for over a month).
Sibongile Mkhize was interviewed in 1996 about her involvement and experiences during
the Seven Days War, and she commented on the widespread looting. First, she made special
mention of the theft of cattle during the chaos (cattle were particularly important to the economic
lifeblood of many rural areas). Mkhize noted that most of the cattle were consolidated at chiefs’
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houses, who most often were Inkatha supporters, and the rest were sold off. She went on to say
that those who attempted to retrieve their cattle were attacked. Mkhize noted that upwardly
mobile homes were particularly targeted because they were viewed to have things of value
inside. She continued by stating, “If you go to these Inkatha homes today, you will see about 5
televisions, 4 fridges, and 3 lounge suites with leopard skins or lion skins. Even if you had
money, why would you buy 3 lounge suites or 5 televisions? In the whole thing the Inkatha
people gained and we lost.”96 In all, these raids and violent attacks were directly beneficial to
those who participated and certainly motivated some Inkatha supporters to be involved.
Another report on the violence of the Seven Days War includes a chronological time
frame and several first-hand accounts, where looting is mentioned several times. 97 For example,
a resident of the township of Taylor’s Halt stated that he was told he should go to Inkatha
meetings, but he refused. Later, his home was completely looted and destroyed.98 A female
resident was intimidated into giving up some food but was otherwise unhurt.99 Another entry in
the report notes that a resident of Gezubuso, “had her television set, radio cassette, and husband’s
clothes stolen.”100 Several other entries in the report make note of stolen and looted items of
varying value, indicating that looters took what they could in the midst of violence. Similar to
Mkhize’s account of the violence, special attention is paid to cattle theft (or “rustling”) in the
report. Cattle rustling is an old practice in KwaZulu due to the symbolic importance and prestige
of a large cattle herd. Cattle is also perceived as materially valuable because cattle are a mainstay
of the rural economy to this day.
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Violence as a Job
Beyond the everyday fighters, full members with special status in Inkatha and low- and
mid-level Inkatha leaders could benefit directly through fees and goods paid for engaging in
violence. Similarly, local chiefs allied with Inkatha benefited not just through salaries and perks
paid out by the KwaZulu government and Inkatha, but also through violence. Christopher Zuma
(mentioned in Chapter 2), during the seeking out and attacking UDF supporters, also used his
status as a local chief to extort membership fees out of those under him and was also accused of
theft of both household goods and cattle. Zuma essentially used his position to become a
racketeer. One young man described that he was forced by men loyal to Zuma to join Inkatha
and pay a membership fee against his will.101 In another instance, a former male Inkatha
member, who was targeted for wanting to leave the organization, stated, “During the course of
that night, [Zuma], together with his followers, broke into our house, looted its contents and stole
and butchered our cow.”102
Almost identical types of racketeering and motives played out in another township near
Pietermaritzburg. Several local Inkatha officials and a chief used their status to extort fines and
fees and threatened those that refused with violence. Some members of the community attempted
to organize in response to what they described as the oppressive nature of Inkatha. In retaliation,
the local leaders and Inkatha officials killed members of one of the families attempting to lead
this new organization. Those affected claimed that they were hit with unfair fines and forced
“donations” to Inkatha, all of which were backed by the threat of violence. 103
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In some cases, the violence itself became a paying job for some Inkatha members.
KwaZulu government Member of Parliament, Inkatha official, and professed impi (a Zulu term
for army) leader Thomas Shabalala was no stranger to violence and extortion. Shabalala claimed
that, “With this [pistol] I will leave hundreds of UDF supporters dead on the battlefield.”104
Shabalala used his status and position to extort a monthly fee from the Lindelani township. This
fee was used to pay Shabalala’s monthly “salary” as well as an “army of 208 ‘cops’ under his
control.”105 Payments towards the police likely not only contributed to Shabalala’s free reign, but
also served as payment for the police to directly engage in the violence on Inkatha’s behalf. This
kind of arrangement was not unusual, since police often sided with Inkatha and reports of police
helping Inkatha were common.106 The KwaZulu Police who were administered by the KwaZulu
homeland government, and thus Inkatha, acted as a paid army for Inkatha’s goals (this will be
discussed in greater length in the last chapter).107 Men around Shabalala also stated that they
were awaiting payment for a raid they carried out against a student meeting (likely a youth or
student organization with links to the UDF). Fees for living in “Inkatha areas” allowed local
leaders aligned with Inkatha to personally enrich themselves and also pay men to carry out raids
and political hits against anyone or any organization that would challenge their rule.
Misizi Jethro Hlope was in a similar situation working for Samuel Begezizwe Yamile in
the late 1980s and later told the Truth and Reconciliation Commission that he aided Yamile in
carrying out violence during the Clermont conflict.108 Hlope worked with a hit squad that was
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targeting people that opposed Inkatha. It was Hlope’s job to point out these people as he knew
what they looked like and where they stayed. Hlope claimed that he never directly engaged in
murder, however. Regardless, for his involvement Hlope was paid by becoming a full cardcarrying member of Inkatha, employment as a Special Constable in the KwaZulu Police, and 600
Rand. Hlope also witnessed Yamile paying others R100 to stay silent on their knowledge or
involvement in murder and assassination. Over the course of his testimony, it is also unclear the
extent to which those killed or targeted were done so for political or personal reasons. Since
Yamile was a local businessman and those targeted were also prominent members of Clermont it
is possible that they were killed to remove market competition for Yamile. Due to the extent of
the violence and the existence of similar cases of local Inkatha leaders abusing their power for
personal gain, those killed were likely targeted for both political and personal/economic reasons
for Yamile.109
The Resource Struggle
Issues of access to limited resources also forced more cases of violence and highlighted
the violence as part of the struggle to survive. In the atmosphere of the 1980s and 90s in
KwaZulu-Natal, violence of any kind was often backed by political organizations such as
Inkatha. Examples of this can most commonly be seen in urban township violence. In one
township, tensions between squatters and permanent residents created a state of conflict. The
large influx of squatters in self-constructed dwellings wanted access to various necessities. A
man from the squatter side described that they simply wanted access to “water, roads, bus stops,”
etc. in the permanent housing section but were denied and attacked.110 Those living in the
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permanent housing sections countered, claiming that the squatters were using up already scarce
resources and were trying to monopolize them for themselves using the threat of force.
Conflict over housing and necessities like water became political as organizations picked
sides to bolster their ranks. Inkatha exerted influence over the squatters and promised them better
conditions if they attacked the permanent housing section. Similarly, the permanent housing
section was offered protection from the squatters and Inkatha by the ANC/UDF. Instead of using
their influence to solve the problem, Inkatha backed a side to bolster their ranks, and the violence
continued to escalate. The desires of the squatters were mobilized to further the goals of Inkatha
and to create a situation where they would have a pool of manpower from which they could
continually recruit. The permanent housing side remarked that Inkatha brought in outside help to
continue the fight. One individual from the squatter side mentioned that he supported Inkatha
because, “Inkatha owns my house,” and the only way to stop the violence would be if everyone
had permanent housing.111
Disputes over resources also played out in cases such as the conflict over the InandaPhoenix Relief Fund. The Inanda-Phoenix Relief Fund was a community created and run project
intended to help those affected by violence, initially for residents of the Inanda and Phoenix
townships outside Durban, but the fund eventually grew to help those throughout KwaZuluNatal.112 One member of the executive committee of the relief fund was a man mentioned earlier,
Winnington Sabelo. He was also a member of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly and an Inkatha
official. Sabelo was charged with bias in how aid was distributed by some of those who applied
for it. Those most affected by the violence, especially those who had their homes destroyed and
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burned, were supposed to receive aid from an impartial board. Sabelo instead used his position to
selectively give aid to Inkatha supporters and denied it to UDF supporters. Sabelo went even
further by targeting UDF supporters who had applied for aid, making others fearful to even
apply.113 Those affected by violence were then presented with a tough decision. Either they could
join Inkatha, likely the organization that caused them to need aid or receive no aid at all.
Given the economic woes and expanding civil war in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s, it is
not surprising that so many turned to violence for personal gain and for survival purposes.
Inkatha was more than willing to capitalize on this situation, providing opportunities to loot and
in some cases even full-time jobs predicated on the use of violence. However, it was most often
the need or desire for wealth and goods that motivated these Inkatha supporters to participate in
these raids.
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Chapter 5: Caprivi Operatives and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Inkatha and the Apartheid State
Now that there is a clear understanding of the motives driving individuals to engage in
violence on Inkatha’s behalf, it’s important to examine how these same motives impact the men
committing violence in some of Inkatha’s most political and high-profile killings. These motives
will appear at various times throughout the struggle the Caprivi Operatives waged in the 1980s
and 1990s and will overlap and coverage in several instances. By following the story of these
men who were closely related to violence in KwaZulu-Natal there will also be an examination of
these motives in the context of “Third Force” arguments. The case of the Caprivi operatives is
likely the most blatant and infamous example of collusion between Inkatha and the Apartheid
State.
Under P.W. Botha’s leadership, Apartheid South Africa had engaged in its Total Strategy
which intended to bolster the already advanced security state and contest black liberation
movements at all costs. Part of this strategy involved working with (and sometimes outright
creating) counter revolutionary movements to act as surrogates for Apartheid state violence.
These surrogates were more acceptable methods of control in areas where white domination was
becoming increasingly difficult. Initially, this strategy largely only applied to areas outside of
South Africa such as the Apartheid governments backing, training, and equipping groups like
UNITA and RENAMO in Angola and Mozambique, respectively.114 However, by the mid-1980s
the Apartheid State began to apply the same policy inside South Africa. This policy was
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motivated both by fear and past success. South Africa was beginning to lose ground beyond its
borders in Angola but organizations like UNITA and RENAMO had proved useful to South
Africa’s interests. Inside South Africa, Inkatha fit a similar mold that the Apartheid state was
looking for and they were already in conflict with the ANC/UDF.115 Additionally, if this project
proved to be a success, the Apartheid state planned to use it in other homelands.116
On November 25th, 1985, Chief Buthelezi and the KwaZulu Police Commissioner,
General Sipho Mathe meet with General Tiene Groenewald, the Director of Military Intelligence,
in Ulundi. General Groenewald informed Chief Buthelezi and General Mathe that uMkhonto we
Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, was planning to assassinate Chief Buthelezi and
several high-ranking members in the KwaZulu government. General Groenewald also mentioned
a plot by the ANC to destroy KwaZulu government buildings.117 Chief Buthelezi responded in
this meeting that he needed greater protection both personally and a better security apparatus for
KwaZulu more broadly. General Groenewald reported this back to the Chief of Staff of
Intelligence who recommended that the government covertly train a defensive and offensive unit
for counterinsurgency in KwaZulu. Chief Buthelezi plus high-ranking members of Inkatha met
again with multiple members of Military Intelligence (MI) and the South African Defense Force
(SADF) in Cape Town to iron out the details.
In all, 200 men would be picked by Inkatha and trained by the SADF. Initially they
agreed on three groups- Intelligence, Defensive contra-mobilization, and Offensive contra-
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mobilization- taken together they would provide targets and early warning to Inkatha, protect
Inkatha VIPs and buildings, and carry out assassinations and attacks against the ANC/UDF. This
would give Inkatha greater capabilities and power in KwaZulu-Natal while allowing the
Apartheid government to support them covertly and indirectly while hampering black opposition.
Military Intelligence code named it Operation Marion.118
Daluxolo Luthuli
In 1979 Daluxolo Luthuli was released from Robben Island after completing his ten years
of hard labor he was sentenced to under the Terrorism Act.119 Daluxolo was the nephew of the
famous Albert Luthuli who was previously a president of the ANC and a Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate, and the son of a very active ANC member, Japhta Skhumbuzo Luthuli (Daluxolo
Luthuli will be referred to by his first name for the remainder of this paper to avoid confusion).
Daluxolo left South Africa as a teen to join MK as encouraged by his father. Daluxolo spent
many years in the ANC camps abroad where he receiving training and served in the Wankie
campaign where MK attempted to infiltrate into Rhodesia (modern day Zimbabwe) but was
captured by white security forces when he attempted to sneak into South Africa. After leaving
prison in 1979, Daluxolo was contacted by the ANC and asked to imbed himself into Inkatha. At
this time the ANC and Inkatha had not yet had their major split (or at least the split was not in
the stage of open violence), and it was thought that Daluxolo could continue helping MK by
organizing young men and women inside Inkatha into joining MK abroad to receive training.
Daluxolo would also report back to the ANC about activities inside Inkatha.120
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Daluxolo’s father, who was also both an ANC and Inkatha member at the time, helped
Daluxolo get membership in Inkatha. Early on, Daluxolo met Chief Buthelezi in person who
remarked that many Zulus were transitioning from the ANC to Inkatha.121 Before long Daluxolo
was in regular contact with Melchizedeck Zakhele ‘M. Z.’ Khumalo who was Chief Buthelezi’s
personal assistant and possibly the second most powerful individual in Inkatha at time.
Additionally, Daluxolo was regularly reporting back to his MK handler, Chris Hani in
Lesotho.122 Daluxolo overtime began to have less frequent contact with Hani which he attributes
to South African Military Intelligence attempting to assassinate Hani. After Hani was forced to
flee Lesotho for Lusaka, Daluxolo lost all contact with MK but continued to work inside
Inkatha.123
Initially, Daluxolo was not very active in Inkatha but “he met people, attended meetings
and gather[ed] information on how the IFP worked.”124 He started his political involvement in
the Inkatha aligned and sponsored United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) as an
organizer. During this time “Daluxolo immersed himself in UWUSA and IFP policy and began
to think and act like an UWUSA shop steward.”125 During his time as an UWUSA organizer,
Daluxolo followed through on the real purpose of UWUSA which was not to fight for workers’
rights and protections (like most trade unions) but to organize workers behind Inkatha.
Furthermore, the union was designed to pull workers away from ANC/UDF aligned COSATU
(Congress of South African Trade Unions) and impress upon them that COSATU was the
enemy. Daluxolo stated plainly, “UWUSA’s enemy was COSATU, not the employers.”126
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The propaganda tactics used by Inkatha (as discussed earlier in this thesis) were used by
Daluxolo as an organizer for UWUSA. Daluxolo would try to convince workers by arguing that
COSATU, like the ANC, was communist aligned, and as such, once they were in power they
would hand over South Africa to the Russians and Chinese who would loot the country of all its
wealth. He elaborates by stating, “We also told them that by calling for disinvestment the
ANC/COSATU alliance wanted to take away their jobs and let their families starve.”127 These
arguments did not always prove to be effective, however, especially among older members who
had a great amount of trust in their COSATU leadership. In these cases, coercion was once again
used as Daluxolo explains, “we resorted to terror and intimidation tactics.”128 Daluxolo’s coauthor Bopela expands on this, stating that there were numerous cases of Inkatha supporters and
UWUSA members intimidating COSATU members into leaving and intimidating employers into
banning COSATU unions. Additionally, Bopela describes a couple of high-profile murders of
COSATU leaders who were targeted because they were both organizing for COSATU and
because they were Zulu and seen as betraying their fellow Zulus.129
Before long Daluxolo rose to a leadership position in Inkatha and later a seat on the
Inkatha Central Committee. Between falling out of touch with his close comrade and handler
Hani and being increasingly active inside Inkatha, Daluxolo “became a true [Inkatha] follower
and not a double agent for the ANC.”130 The ANC called Daluxolo to Swaziland for a meeting
where he gave them some information, but they expressed their displeasure with Daluxolo rising
to such a senior position and stated that this was not Daluxolo’s mission. Daluxolo countered that
he felt he could not refuse the position and he can now give the ANC top level information. It
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appears that the trust was broken, however, because when Daluxolo was called to Swaziland
again he did not attend and was tipped off by a friend that the ANC was possibly going to kill
him.131
With the rise of the UDF in 1983 and increasing violence between them and Inkatha in
the realms of students, workers, and increasingly everyday people, Daluxolo found himself
increasingly involved in Inkatha’s leadership. As he was working hard to propagandize workers
to pull them away from COSATU and into UWUSA, he would have seen, heard, and
participated in this atmosphere of violence. He increasingly not just identified with Inkatha but
came to see the ANC/UDF as the enemy. Despite Daluxolo being no stranger to violence, the
UDF’s practice of necklacing (placing a gasoline-soaked tire around the body, usually the neck,
of a suspected informant for SAP or SADF and igniting it leading to a painful and public
execution) appalled Daluxolo, describing the practice as “barbaric.”132
In April of 1986 Daluxolo was approached by three Inkatha members: M. Z. Khumaloassistant to Chief Buthelezi, Siegfried Bhengu- ex-MK fighter and Central Committee member,
Mangaqa Mncwango- also a Central Committee member. Daluxolo was informed that Inkatha
was creating an armed wing and he was to be appointed Chief Political Commissar of this new
wing (this position would later evolve into commander of Inkatha’s contra mobilization forces
and eventually overall commander of the Caprivi operatives). Daluxolo accepted the position and
swore to keep it a secret.133 What Daluxolo did not know at the time is that he had just agreed to
head a force of operatives and hitmen that would be trained and dependent on the SADF under
Operation Marion as discussed between Chief Buthelezi and SADF/MI.
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Caprivi
On April 16th Daluxolo was called to an urgent meeting at a camp near Ulundi. There
Daluxolo found 50 other men as well as several members of Inkatha’s leadership. He was
informed by the leadership that these men were to be the first to undergo military training and he
would go with them. They were to leave immediately, Daluxolo did not even get to pack a bag or
say goodbye to his fiancée. Daluxolo and the men were covertly transported to the Louis Botha
Airport (Durban International today) in a furniture removal truck. They boarded an SA Air Force
C130 transport plane and took off to an unknown destination. A rumor started that they were
going to Israel to be trained by Mossad. No one knew how far Israel was from South Africa, so
after five hours of flight time and arriving in an arid environment, they believed that they truly
had arrived in Israel.134 They arrived in darkness and were driven through the early morning to
their camp where they were ordered to dismount. At first light it became clear that their camp
was only brush and there was nothing around besides four huts which were occupied by white
instructors.135
It was only later that Daluxolo realized they had landed on the Caprivi strip in modern
day Namibia. Specifically, Hippo Base which was part of the Military Intelligence’s overall San
Michelle base which was used for training guerillas and counterrevolutionary groups.136 The
group of 50 men set to work building their base and were soon joined by 3 more staggered
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groups of about 50 men bringing the total number of men up to 202. Each group of 50 men chose
a man to be their leader and were assigned a white instructor to provide their specialized training.
The white instructors claimed to be private contractors and gave noms de guerre like JJ and JP.
Daluxolo described the beginning of their instruction as “a six week course in basic
discipline, drill, physical training, and political indoctrination.”137 Every man was given and
trained with a G3 and an AK-47 rifle because the G3 was the standard issue rifle for KwaZulu
Police, and the AK-47 was used by the ANC/UDF and was an increasingly common weapon in
South Africa.138 Beyond their standard issue rifles the men were taught how to operate a number
of weapons from both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, as well as explosives. They also
received extensive instruction in “guerilla and counter-guerilla warfare”.139 Daluxolo describes
his role at this stage by stating, he “didn’t train the men himself, but interpreted where necessary,
helped to explain things, motivated the men and demonstrated what the instructors wanted
done.”140
For the last part of their training the 202 men then broke into 4 groups to receive
specialization in an area chosen based on their physical and mental traits as well as performance
in the various areas of training so far. Daluxolo as well as the white officers choose which men
would be placed in which groups. The largest group was the so called Contra-Mobilization group
which had 100 men and was led by Joyful Mthethwa. This group engaged in propaganda for
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Inkatha in generic forms such as giving speeches, lectures, and providing pamphlets to “expand
Inkatha’s support base and promote its image as a liberation organization.”141 Their propaganda
duties also extended to recruiting further organizers. The Contra-Mobilization group also further
helped the Caprivi operatives by identifying rival leaders and organizers to be targeted such as
those in the UDF as well as internal ‘trouble-makers’ who opposed Inkatha or hampered its
growth.142
The Contra-Mobilization group would report these targets to the Defensive group which
specialized in intelligence and was made up of 30 men headed by Sitwell Mkhwanazi and
Phumlani Mshengu. Daluxolo referred to the defensive group as the most important because it
was the “eyes, ears, and brain” for the Caprivi operatives.143 The Defensive group took in
rumors, observations, and hearsay. After taking in this information, the Defensive group would
in turn verify it and transform it into workable intelligence. The Defensive group was also
trained to engage in their own spy work and intelligence gathering to collect useful
information.144
Part of this information collection was also to identify targets which would then be
eliminated by the Offensive group. The Offensive group consisted of 40 men led by Leslie
Mkhulisi and Peter Msane who were chosen for their physical acumen as much as their
ruthlessness. Daluxolo describes that these men were called oTheleweni (ruthless killers in
isiZulu) and calls the Offensive group “men who placed a low premium on life and would
eliminate the party’s enemies without batting an eyelid.”145 Because the Offensive group would
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be eliminating targets their members were the top performers in weapons, explosives, and
physical training. Their specialized training would consist of home invasion, abduction,
ambushing, and booby-traps.146
The final group of 32 men would make up the VIP Protection Unit and were led by Bheki
Zikalala. This group would be responsible for the protection of various VIPs inside and
associated with Inkatha. This group was chosen from the men that excelled in driving
(particularly in terms of protecting the VIP), handguns, and marksmanship. This is the only
group whose activities were entirely legal as having armed bodyguards in South Africa was not
only legal but common practice among politicians and VIPs.147
Over the course of their training and especially when Daluxolo attended the officers’
meetings, it became clear to him that their white instructors were not in fact private contractors
as they claimed but SADF officers. Daluxolo’s suspicion was later confirmed when he learned
that all the white instructors he had met were either SADF, MI, or both. For example, one
instructor Major Jake Jacobs (nom de guerre JJ) was a recce operator and experienced specialist
in training RENAMO fighters.148 Although Daluxolo was near certain that the men training him
were SADF officers he was not fazed by this and wrote that at the time he felt “it made no
difference to the eventual result, so he just got on with it.”149 Beyond this Daluxolo doesn’t
directly expand on why at the time he was unbothered by the fact he was being trained by men

146

Bopela and Luthuli, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 204.
Bopela and Luthuli, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 204.
148
Recce (slang for reconnaissance) is the colloquial term for the South African Special Forces. This group was
involved in a wide range of conflicts in Southern Africa during the Cold War and operated inside South Africa as
both a counter-terrorism unit and secretive tool of Military Intelligence to stoke conflict in majority black areas
during the 1980s and 90s. For more information see Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa by Daniel L.
Douek.
149 Bopela and Luthuli, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 202.
147

55

from the same organization he fought against in Zimbabwe or part of the Apartheid state which
Inkatha claimed to against.
What Daluxolo does explain, shortly after writing that he came to this realization, is that
while undergoing training he and the other Caprivi operatives received political indoctrination
and each month M. Z. Khumalo would arrive with a salary of R400 (R500 for Daluxolo as an
officer) and a message of satisfaction with the progress the men were making. Furthermore, the
men were promised positions inside the KwaZulu Police after their training and Daluxolo knew
he would have a continuing role as Political Commissar of Inkatha’s new paramilitary wing.150
With political indoctrination which reenforced that the ANC was the enemy, and a salary
perhaps it is easier to see why SADF instructors “made no difference to the eventual result” to
Daluxolo at the time.151
Brian Quna Mkhize was one of the Caprivi operatives under Daluxolo’s command in the
Contra-Mobilization unit and described a similar overall experience to Daluxolo. Brian Mkhize’s
experience is also exemplative of the general Caprivi operative’s experience. Brian Mkhize grew
up in KwaZulu and was early on in his life involved with Inkatha. Mkhize was one of many
children during the 70s who was introduced and indoctrinated by Inkatha through its Ubuntu
education system in KwaZulu. Additionally, both of Mkhize’s parents were supporters of Inkatha
with Mkhize’s father even holding a position in the KwaZulu government as a Counsellor. In
March of 1989 Mkhize was unemployed and was job searching when he was approached by
Zakhile Mkhize. Zakhile Mkhize was Brian Mkhize’s cousin and a local Inkatha leader in the
Mpumalanga area. Zakhile offered Brian Mkhize a job in the KwaZulu Police Force and Brian
Mkhize accepted. After going through a brief selection process to make sure he was an
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acceptable candidate for Caprivi, Brian described the same experience of suddenly arriving and
training at Caprivi as Daluxolo.152
Mkhize stressed that while he was at Caprivi, propaganda was a central part of his
training, much of which he was taught either directly or at least in part by Daluxolo most days.
Mkhize recalled that, “from the time we arrived at Caprivi, politics was our daily bread.”153
Mkhize also made it clear that this propaganda training was not just on the politics and positions
of Inkatha. Mkhize described that his training “emphasized that we should know it very well,
whom we are fighting against and why we are fighting.”154 Another point that Mkhize stressed
helped him through the training was the fact that he and the other Caprivi Operatives each
received R400 per month during his training at Caprivi. While he was largely unable to spend his
money during his training at Caprivi (due to its remoteness), he did not have to pay for housing,
clothes, food, etc. during this time. Mkhize said that this provided a large sum which he could
utilize after the end of his training.155 On top of this, Mkhize recalled that each man received a
R2000 bonus for completing the training, a large sum in the 80s.156
After receiving their training, the Caprivi operatives held a parade and demonstration of
the skills and training they had learned in front of M.Z. Khumalo and various white South
African military leaders. Chief Buthelezi did not attend this ceremony, which Daluxolo attributes
to the bad press Chief Buthelezi would have gotten if anyone had found out that he was there
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with white military leaders.157 The ceremony was however videotaped and Daluxolo was
informed by M.Z. Khumalo that Chief Buthelezi received a copy.158
After this the Caprivi operatives were flown back to South Africa and from the airport
were driven back to Nhlungwane Camp in KwaZulu. Here all the Caprivians meet Chief
Buthelezi who personally welcomed them home and “thanked them for volunteering to defend
[Inkatha].”159 Chief Buthelezi continued to couch his language in terms of defense, even to his
own men, to assure them of the justness of their cause as well as keep up appearances at this
seemingly public event. If what M. Z. Khumalo told Daluxolo was true, then Chief Buthelezi
would have certainly known that the training and intended use of the Caprivi operatives was not
purely defensive. The Caprivians also meet various KwaZulu Police leaders who they would
outwardly appear to be operating under as detective constables to disguise their operations as
Caprivians. After these final festivities, the Caprivi operatives would either receive more training
elsewhere in South Africa for six weeks or receive a month off before beginning their new work
for Inkatha.160 After receiving his additional training, Brian Mkhize started his position in the
KwaZulu Police. In his case, he was initially placed near Pietermartizburg as the area needed
help against the ANC/UDF. The use of the KwaZulu Police as covers turned out to be a lucrative
arrangement for the Caprivi operatives as they received both a continuing salary of R700 for
their roles as Caprivians and a standard KwaZulu policeman’s salary on top of that.161
Soon after the “graduation” ceremony, Daluxolo and M. Z. Khumalo traveled to a
meeting at a SADF military base in Mtubatuba with several high ranking military officers, some
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of whom Daluxolo had met before but also some new faces. This group would become the
Planning Committee and were intended to control the targets and operations of the Caprivi
Operatives. The Planning Committee decided that three of the four Caprivi Operative groups
were placed under the command of white officers who controlled their access to weapons and
vehicles provided by the SADF, especially in the case of the Offensive group. Daluxolo assumed
command of the Contra-mobilization group as this group was staying close to their homes and
largely engaged in political propaganda work and intelligence gathering.162
This meeting once again caused Daluxolo to question what he was doing, largely
regarding Inkatha’s willingness to work with, if not under, the white SADF (Daluxolo blankets
them as the Boers). He raised these concerns with M.Z. Khumalo by asking, “why the white
people who trained them in Caprivi were rejoining them in Natal. Were they going to direct
operations and select targets? If that was so, how could the Caprivians be able to escape the
reality that they were being commanded by SADF officers? Had the IFP become a surrogate
organization of the Boers? If it had, was Chief Minister Buthelezi aware of this and did he
approve?”163
M. Z. Khumalo attempted to ease Daluxolo’s mind by informing him that Chief
Buthelezi was aware of the situation and did approve it. He also explained the reasoning of the
Caprivians working under the SADF by stating, “They are giving us the money and weapons that
enable us to fight, so we can’t just brush them aside now that the training is over.”164 Daluxolo
was not wholly satisfied by this explanation and worried about Inkatha’s position as a liberation
movement. He worried that Inkatha would instead be forced to attack those that had not attacked
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Inkatha first. M. Z. Khumalo promised he would bring these concerns to Chief Buthelezi and
“provide feedback” but it was unlikely he ever even raised these concerns.165 After this Daluxolo
was often excluded from Planning Committee meetings, he suspects this is because M. Z.
Khumalo told the committee he was “asking awkward questions.”166 Daluxolo’s concerns would
turn out to be justified but this was a path that Inkatha took itself rather than one that was
imposed by the SADF. Regardless, Daluxolo still largely kept his concerns to himself and
continued with his duties with the Caprivi operatives. At this time, he still had a “disgust” of the
UDF and felt they had attacked Inkatha and must be punished in kind.167
The First Hit
In late 1986 M. Z. Khumalo wanted the Caprivi Operatives to get involved in offensive
operations and requested action from the officers in Military Intelligence. The officers agreed
and Daluxolo was told by Captain Opperman of MI that he should select four targets “whose
death would have a positive impact on Inkatha.”168 Daluxolo in turn ordered the Defensive group
to compile a list of four targets with full dossiers. The prime target selected was Victor Ntuli who
was a “UDF activist and… paymaster.”169 On January 20th, 1987, Daluxolo and 11 other men
(mostly from the Offensive group) arrived at a dry riverbed where they received AK-47s from
Captain Opperman to carry out the hit. The men taped flashlights to their weapons to see in the
dark, outlined how they were going to enter and sweep the house, and practiced one last time
with their weapons. They were told by Captain Opperman to kill all occupants of the house.170
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The men piled into a white Combi (small bus) and traveled to the Ntuli residence where
they efficiently and brutally carried out the hit, spraying tens of bullets into each room killing as
they went. In all 13 people were killed, mostly women and children who were relatives of Victor
Ntuli, but not Victor Ntuli himself. Ntuli was spared as he was not even in the residence and had
been in hiding for the past month. Despite missing their target and the killing of so many
innocents the Caprivians and the security officers called their raid a success. South African
Police arriving on the scene later helped cover up any evidence that might have implicated the
Caprivi operatives or any government involvement.171
While the level of brutality of that night would be repeated too many times to count over
the coming years, the involvement of MI and the SADF would wane. Captain Opperman later
alleged that his superiors ordered an end to all Operation Marion activities. The reason for this
stoppage is unclear but it could be that the high profile and brazen murder of innocents worried
Military Intelligence. Over this period MI’s control over the Caprivi operatives was slowly
shifted to the South African Police who were providing the covers and “jobs” for the Caprivians
during the day. By 1989 SAP buildings and Inkatha buildings across KwaZulu-Natal acted as
bases of operations for the Caprivians. Additionally, the Caprivians increasingly only acted on
instructions from Inkatha officials or operated in small groups entirely independently. One of the
Caprivians confirmed that many of his instructions came from Inkatha during his TRC hearing
when he stated that, “There was no difference between the KwaZulu Police, the IFP and the
KwaZulu government. In my opinion they were one entity. I received instructions [to kill people]
from Captain Langeni [KwaZulu Police], Mr. MZ Khumalo [KwaZulu government] and [Mr.
Daluxolo] Luthuli [Inkatha].”172
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Many Caprivians would only show up to Ulundi once a month to get paid and most of
those actively operating were only engaged in fighting in their own local area.173 The original
groups and structure of the Caprivi operatives also began to break down, particularly by the
1990s. Men that were capable were pulled to areas where they were needed or operated in the
same area for extended periods of time, relying on who was local rather then what group they
belonged too. This meant that Daluxolo expanded his command over most Caprivians as he was
the leader on the ground able to make decisions. This is in contrast to MI or even the SAP who
tried to keep their direct involvement in Caprivi activities at arm’s length. The Security Branch
did not totally divest themselves from the Caprivi operatives and Operation Marion, however, as
they still provided arms and ammunition on multiple occasions and continued to fund the
Caprivians until at least 1991, likely longer.174
This next section will largely pull its evidence from the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) in South Africa in the late 1990s. This commission was designed to help pull
the Republic of South Africa together by encouraging the nation to hear and watch those affected
by violence tell their story and allowing those who committed violence to give their testimonies
to an open session that was also broadcasted on radio and television. For those who committed
violence, the TRC allowed them to apply for amnesty for their crimes under the conditions that
they told the full truth about their involvement and could prove that their crime was politically
motivated. This thesis will be primarily pulling from these amnesty hearings from Inkatha
supporters and Caprivians like Daluxolo. Because these men are applying for amnesty and
attempting to prove that their crimes are completely politically motivated, this thesis will at times
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question these testimonies regarding what information they omit, lie about, or how it is otherwise
presented.
This is not intended to negate or otherwise accuse the entire testimony of being false nor
is this intended to be a critique of the Truth and Reconciliation process. After all, this thesis is
still utilizing this information and operating under the same assumption of the committee that the
majority of the information is truthful and will be challenged when necessary. Due to the nature
of this violence, the TRC provides a valuable source of information that otherwise would not be
available. Nevertheless, the information provided must be approached with a certain level of
caution which must be pointed out before the discussion of Caprivi operative and hit squad
activities unfold in this chapter.
Mpumalanga 1986-1987
After the attempted assassination of Victor Ntuli and massacre at the Ntuli residence,
Daluxolo was ordered by Inkatha leadership to move to Mpumalanga and take control of the
situation there. Daluxolo began his involvement in 1986 but was in full control of Caprivi
operative activities in the area by 1987. Daluxolo was faced with a dilemma when he first arrived
at Mpumalanga due to the intense violence and what he described as the undisciplined nature of
Inkatha supporters there. This was causing an internal struggle in the local Mpumalanga Inkatha
branch between Zakhile Mkhize and a Mrs. Qolo (her full name is never given). Mkhize was the
Chairman of the Mpumalanga Inkatha branch and a member of the Inkatha Central Committee.
His faction supported what Daluxolo described as the reckless violence against the UDF and
anyone they saw as UDF supporting. Daluxolo described that they attacked in broad daylight,
would attack whole families if even a single member supported the UDF, or even attack those
that they saw as economically well off. Qolo and her faction supported ending the violence and
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Daluxolo was generally supportive of her position. His position as political commissar likely
influenced his opinion that the aggressive brand of violence used by Mkhize’s supporters were
harming the image of Inkatha not only in Mpumalanga but nationally.175
Daluxolo and Qolo were summoned to Ulundi to meet with Chief Buthelezi as well as the
KwaZulu cabinet to find that Mkhize was already there. Mkhize had complained to Chief
Buthelezi and others in the KwaZulu/Inkatha leadership that Daluxolo and Qolo were letting
Inkatha supporters be attacked by the UDF and not allowing them to defend themselves.
Daluxolo clarified his position by stating he was concerned with the lack of discipline among the
Inkatha supporters in Mpumalanga and brought his concerns about the reckless actions of these
supporters. Mkhize was forced to accept that some of his supporters did engage in these actions
and Chief Buthelezi subsequently agreed with Daluxolo’s position and ordered him to return to
Mpumalanga to “fix things.”176
Daluxolo did as he was told and worked to install discipline, but by no means did he
think his mission was to end the violence, nor did he intend to in this crucial battleground area
during 1987. Instead, he encouraged violence to be carried out at night and targets to be more
clearly defined. Daluxolo also forbade Inkatha supporters from speaking openly about the fact
that almost all the police in the area were Inkatha members or at least Inkatha aligned.177 He
recognized the leadership’s position that the violence was necessary to Inkatha’s mission in
Mpumalanga, but Inkatha must maintain the ability of denial to protect their popular support. In
many ways, Daluxolo applied what he learned as a political organizer and at Caprivi and used it
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to continue to persuade the Mpumalanga Inkatha supporters towards violence in a more
“practical” manner.
Clermont and Pietermartizburg
In the middle of 1987, M. Z. Khumalo at Ulundi pulled Daluxolo away from
Mpumalanga to deal with urgent business in Clermont, a township near Durban (not to be
confused with Claremont, the suburb of Cape Town). When he arrived in Clermont, Daluxolo
was placed at the disposal of local leader Samuel Yamile who was the Clermont Inkatha
Chairman and a KwaZulu Member of Parliament (later Deputy Minister). Yamile had been
working to turn Clermont to an Inkatha stronghold but had faced fierce UDF opposition, so much
so that an attempt was made on his life by a hand grenade attack. Other Caprivi operatives were
also transported on kombis to Clermont to protect Yamile and his properties.
Yamile told Daluxolo that he was certain that the main man behind the attack was Zazi
Khuzwayo who Yamile had been in conflict with for some time. Yamile even mentioned that he
had attempted to have Khuzwayo killed many times before but had not succeeded. Yamile
further justified Khuzwayo as the target by telling Daluxolo, “if we could kill Mr. Khuzwayo, it
would be easy to convert Clermont into an IFP area.”178 Daluxolo then went to work planning
the hit but he would stay with Yamile while it was carried out.
Daluxolo utilized four Caprivi operatives that were assigned to protect Yamile to carry
out the hit- Pumlani Mshengo, Nosboo ‘Spo’ Bengu, Bekhisiso ‘Alex’ Khumalo, and Vela
Nquno. Pumlani Mshengo and Nosboo Bengu were supposed to be the ones actually killing
Khuzwayo and were armed with .38 Special revolvers supplied by Daluxolo.179 Bekhisiso
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Khumalo and Vela Nquno were supposed to stand guard and were armed with 9mm pistols
supplied by Yamile. Hleganpani Yamile, Samuel Yamile’s son, would drive the Caprivians
because he was the only one who knew the area well (ironically, he drove them around in a
hearse).180 Another local, Misizi Hlope, also rode with them because he knew Khuzwayo well
and could point him out to the Caprivians.181
Bekhisiso Khumalo described the hit“When we parked outside the post office, Msisi got out of the car as planned and went to
check inside [Khuzwayo’s] shop. He returned and told us that everything was okay.
Because we had agreed that if he was there, he would be in his office. We got out of the
car and Msisi disappeared. Then we went separately into the shop. I and Vela were the
first ones to go in and pretended to be buying something. At that time, Pumlani Mshengo
and Spo Bengu appeared, passed us and then disappeared. At that, when they passed us,
we went to position ourselves by the entrance. I then heard gunshots. After that Pumlani
and Spo emerged, passed us and then we followed them. When we left this place, when
we already on the street, I heard gunshots behind me. When I looked back, I saw Vela's
gun pointing upwards, then I realised that he was shooting in the air and I proceeded.
Before I got to the car, I also heard gunshots. I turned back, but I couldn't see anything. I
was the last one to get into the car. We then agreed that we should go straight to
Mpumalanga. We then arrived at Mpumalanga and I am not sure who amongst us phoned
Yamile's house to inform them that everything had gone well.”182
Daluxolo then went to Mpumalanga to collect the Caprivi operatives and bring them back
to Yamile’s house. When he arrived, he decided that Mshengo and Bengu should stay in
Mpumalanga for a bit in case their faces were recognized in Clermont, which could cause them
to be targeted by the UDF. After returning to Yamile’s house and explaining the hit was
successful, Yamile was excited and gave Daluxolo and all the Caprivi operatives R100 as a thank
you. Hlope was rewarded even further for showing his loyalty and helping Yamile in other
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instances. Hlope would receive membership into Inkatha, a job as Zulu Police Special Constable
(kitskonstabel) with a 9mm pistol and identification to match, and after doing a few more jobs
for Yamile he would act as his personal security and would receive a R600 salary in 1989. Hlope
also noted that he was not always sure of the motive behind Yamile’s choice of targets, many of
whom Yamile had ordered the assassination of both before, during, and after the Caprivians were
in Clermont. Hlope speculated that the reasons behind these hits may have been because these
people were in competition with Yamile’s business interests and he may have used Inkatha
members and the Caprivians to advance himself financially, these statements could not be
confirmed by Hlope however.183
After the hit in Clermont, Daluxolo was then told by M. Z. Khumalo to bring some
Caprivi operatives and go to the area around Pietermaritzburg controlled by local Inkatha aligned
chiefs (amakozi, singular Inkozi or Nkosi). Daluxolo and his fellow Caprivians (largely from the
contra-mobilization group) spent most of their time in Chief (Nkosi) Nqobo’s area because he
was losing support and land to the UDF. Another hit squad was already active in the
Pietermaritzburg area led by KwaZulu Police Captain Hlengwa. This hit squad was mostly made
of locals but also included Caprivi operative Bigboy Ndlovu who embedded himself into the
local police and hit squad because he was born and raised in the area.184
A group of KwaZulu MPs and Chiefs came to Chief Nqobo and expressed their
frustration at his area being UDF dominated. Daluxolo explained that “the inkozi was told to call
a meeting of the community. Those who did not attend the meeting, would have to leave the area
and move to areas which were controlled by the comrades. I realised that the inkozi was in
trouble because he was put in a situation where he didn't really belong in. He was being forced to

183
184

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Misizi Jethro Hlope,” TRC Amnesty Hearings, Day 6.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” TRC Amnesty Hearings, Day 1.

67

call a meeting. Those who didn't attend these meetings, would be killed by hit squad, the
Hlengwa hit squad in the night.”185 At this same meeting Hlengwa was also ordered to use his hit
squad to kill a local counsellor who was defiant of Chief Nqobo and declaring his support for the
UDF. Daluxolo recalled that Hlengwa’s hit squad carried out numerous attacks while he was in
the Pietermaritzburg area and also engaged in cattle rustling. Beyond the economic benefits of
cattle rustling as discussed before, the stealing of cattle had a political purpose because the
number of cattle was tied to power in Zulu custom. Thus, the stealing of cattle was intended to
signal that the opposition was weak while the Inkatha backed chiefs were strong.186
Daluxolo claims that he was not involved in any of Hlengwa’s hit squad activities at this
time but instead was more directly engaged in propaganda and training activities. Daluxolo
recalled, “I had come with the contra-mobilization group, it was to accompany the Nkosi when
he went to meetings in different districts. Then the contra-mobilization would educate the youth
about Inkatha and at the same time, they will train the youth on how to protect themselves and in
the handling of guns so that they could assist the Nkosi when we left.”187 Again we see Daluxolo
applying his training at Caprivi not only to be utilized in propaganda efforts but also to train
others in direct action and violence campaigns.188
Mpumalanga 1987-1990
Daluxolo then returned to Mpumalanga from 1987-1988 and the situation there had only
escalated since his absence. Inkatha continued to engage in public and ruthless violence in
attempts to control the entire area and threaten the opposition into silence. Daluxolo described
Inkatha as being involved in the “kidnapping, rape, stealing, burning and the shooting of, killing
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of people in broad daylight.”189 Because of Inkatha’s continued brazen actions and targeting of
even those not aligned with the UDF, the UDF was instead beginning to swell in popularity.
With more support from the community and experience from Inkatha attacks, the UDF’s resolve
was beginning to harden. Daluxolo again attempted to enforce discipline in the local Inkatha
supporters and move activities away from broad daylight attacks and the targeting of non-aligned
individuals. And again, Daluxolo was no stranger to violence, and continued to organize and/or
take part in numerous attacks and raids on the UDF controlled areas in Mpumalanga.190
Not long after Daluxolo’s return to Mpumalanga a fellow Caprivi operative, Walter
Ntalani, who was living and operating in the area had their home attacked by the UDF. While
Ntalani was not harmed, his sister was killed. This brazen daytime attack against one of their
own sparked Daluxolo and his fellow Caprivians in the area into action. Daluxolo collected
several Caprivi operatives living in and around the area to retaliate immediately, especially
because Ntalani was able to identify his attackers and he knew where they lived. The group
moved out at night towards the house of Ntalani’s attackers. Upon arriving the group threw
petrol bombs into the house and shot at the people running out of the burning building. Daluxolo
was not certain if they survived or died under this hail of bullets. Satisfied that he and his group
had had their revenge on their target he left command with David Ndlamini and Sibisi Nqolo.
They continued to attack other houses in the area, although Daluxolo did not stay to see this.191
In another instance in Mpumalanga, Daluxolo provided several AK-47s and 9mm
handguns to an Inkatha supporter who requested them to carry out a retaliatory attack against the
UDF. When local police officers investigated the scene they found the AK-47 cartridges and
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went to Zakhile Mkhize asking about the guns so that they could “find” the AKs somewhere and
cover up the crime for Inkatha. Mkhize pointed them towards Daluxolo who had provided the
weapons. Daluxolo not wanting to give away that he had likely acquired the AK-47s through his
activities as a Caprivi operative, refused to give any information or weapons to these policemen.
The police then accused him of being an MK fighter and arrested him.192 Daluxolo was
eventually able to clear his name by taking the police to talk to M. Z. Khumalo at Ulundi. The
police continued to hold Daluxolo until M. Z. Khumalo brought the guns to them. Daluxolo was
eventually released on bail but the charges against him were already filed.193
In August 1988 the Planning Committee, which was still technically in control of the
Caprivi operatives, was deeply worried that the charges against Daluxolo could uncover the
relationship between Inkatha and the Apartheid state. Internally, high officers in the SADF were
deeply worried that Daluxolo was going to tell everyone in prison about Operation Marion and
threaten the National Party’s hold on to power and Inkatha as a whole. They requested Military
Intelligence carry out an assassination on Daluxolo, but MI officials would not do it unless local
police and Inkatha were on board. M. Z. Khumalo was greatly opposed and so the assassination
option was dropped.194 Daluxolo did not know of this potential assassination until after 1994.
Instead, the Planning Committee met with Daluxolo in Durban and informed him that he would
skip his next bail meeting and instead be sent into hiding on a MI base in Lesotho. During this

192

The fact the guns were AK-47s and thus the weapon most commonly used by MK likely pushed this accusation
after Daluxolo’s refusal to hand them over. Daluxolo was given the AK-47s by MI to hide Inkatha’s and the state’s
involvement in some of the killings creating an ironic twist to this accusation.
193 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” TRC Amnesty Hearings, Day 1.
194 Bopela and Luthuli, Umkhonto we Sizwe, 210.

70

time the Planning Committee would work behind the scenes to attempt to destroy the charges
against Daluxolo and any evidence that could link the crime to Operation Marion.195
Daluxolo was then moved to another camp in KwaZulu-Natal before returning to his
same activities in Mpumalanga in 1989. While Daluxolo was in hiding the situation in
Mpumalanga had only worsened. No longer was it Inkatha raids into UDF controlled areas and
counter actions by the UDF but a state of civil war in Mpumalanga with near constant fighting.
During this time Inkatha’s local leader Zakhile Mkhize had been killed and a power vacuum
opened up. Another Inkatha chairman, Sipho Mlaba, stepped into this role in large part due to MI
officer Major Paul Berry who provided him with bodyguards, planning, and other support.196
After Daluxolo had been commanding Inkatha forces in Mpumalanga during three particularly
tough days of fighting he contacted Major Paul Berry about launching an attack at a UDF
stronghold named 25 Rand. This neighborhood had been the source of numerous attacks against
Mlaba’s areas of influence in Mpumalanga. Major Paul Berry informed Daluxolo that the attack
would have to be postponed so he could remove his men from the area. Daluxolo was confused
by this and had the following conversation with the Major“Major”, Daluxolo asked incredulously, “you have men at 25 Rand?”
“Yes, I have, Commander Luthuli”, the major responded.
“What are they doing there, Major? The people who have mounted attack after attack
against Mlaba’s house liver there. What’s the role of your men?”
“Military Intelligence’s role is to keep balance and ensure that neither side wipes out the
other. If that happens the fighting will stop. In a nutshell, if the IFP gains the upper hand our men
intervene on the side of the UDF and vice versa.”
Daluxolo stood there flabbergasted and speechless.
“You seem surprised Commander Luthuli. I felt sure you knew this.”
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“So the people at 25 Rand who’ve been attacking and killing our supporters could be
your men?”
“It’s possible”, the major responded diffidently.197

Daluxolo was filled with rage, but he quietly left his meeting with Major Paul Berry and
went to talk with Mlaba. Daluxolo explained what he had learned from the Major to Mlaba, and
the two men decided to call off their attack on 25 Rand. The two men then drank and thought
through the night on what to do about their predicament in Mpumalanga. Eventually, the two
men decided to “halt all anti-UDF operations” and move towards opening communication with
the UDF.198 The idea was to move towards some sort of settlement or at least a ceasefire rather
than continue to play into the hands of MI and the Apartheid government. The men also decided
to not contact Ulundi or any higher ups in Inkatha about their decision as they would likely try to
force them back to fighting. They figured it would be harder for Inkatha officials to reverse the
peace after it had been cemented and it was better to ask for forgiveness rather than
permission.199
Mlaba was able to convince Mr. Mbambo who owned a funeral parlor in Mpumalanga
and represented Inkatha to start peace talks with his friend Boy Maqinga Mjola who represented
the ANC/UDF. Despite some initial difficulties the talks were proving successful and Mlaba
began to speak publicly and positively of the peace talks in the area. The Inkatha leadership,
including Chief Buthelezi, was angered by this peace initiative as Inkatha was still in conflict
with the ANC/UDF in other areas and did not want to appear weak. Despite this a ceasefire was
called in Mpumalanga and Daluxolo was adamant in his testimony that it was the local people
that made peace possible. He stated, “The peace initiative in Mpumalanga was organised by the
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Mpumalanga community because they were tired of killing each other. That is the reason why
the initiative succeeded, not really because the IFP showed its commitment or encourage [sic]
Mlaba to pursue the peace process.”200
Despite Daluxolo’s earlier acquiescence to Inkatha’s close relationship to the Apartheid
state and working alongside white officers, Daluxolo could not keep the cognitive dissonance at
bay for much longer. Daluxolo’s loyalty to Inkatha leadership, his pride and identification in his
Zulu-ness, and the political messaging of Inkatha all meant little when it was apparent that he
and the men he commanded were being used as pawns. Daluxolo could not simply stop or give
up, however. He knew all too well that those that stopped could and would be targeted- “made to
ride the first bus” was the code they used for killing one of their own.201 This was a serious
threat. Several Caprivians had already meet that fate. This threat also likely affected many
Caprivians, not just Daluxolo, and kept them in the fight even as they grew weary towards the
end.202 Daluxolo’s rank and closeness with the Inkatha leadership had largely protected him from
that fate so far, but he knew that he was on thin ice. Daluxolo had been recalled to Ulundi to sit
behind a desk instead of work in the field as punishment for his role in the Mpumalanga peace
initiative and so that Inkatha leadership and Military Intelligence could keep a close eye on
him.203
Another reason Daluxolo was recalled and remained in Ulundi during 1991 was due to
the Goldstone Commission. In July 1991 the then Weekly Mail (today the Mail & Guardian)
obtained internal state Security Branch documents which detailed the state’s close relationship
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with Inkatha, including many of the main objectives of Operation Marion, the transfer of money
to fund Inkatha and other counter-revolutionary groups in South Africa and Southwest Africa
(Namibia), and the training of the Caprivi operatives. This leak by the Weekly Mail and
subsequent scandal is often referred to as “Inkathagate.”204 In no small part due to the Weekly
Mail, F. W. de Klerk created the formally titled Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention
of Public Violence and Intimidation, to investigate the political violence occurring in South
Africa from 1991 to the election in 1994. Justice Richard Goldstone was selected to head the
commission and so it is commonly referred to as the Goldstone Commission.205
Inkatha as a whole and its leadership was deeply implicated by the Weekly Mail report
and decided that some of its members would testify at the Goldstone Commission. Daluxolo was
one of those selected to testify but before he testified, Daluxolo had a meeting with M. Z.
Khumalo, M. Armzemla- Secretary of the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly, and a Mr. Mkhize- a
high ranking Inkatha official. At this meeting it was decided that Daluxolo and all Inkatha
members would deny all allegations and lie whenever necessary. At his Goldstone Commission
hearing Daluxolo claimed that he and all the other Caprivi Operatives only received training to
be part of the KwaZulu Police. Daluxolo denied all involvement in hit squad activities and even
went as far as denying knowledge of or having met people like Yamile. Daluxolo described that
M. Z. Khumalo pushed the most for Daluxolo to lie to protect Inkatha and Chief Buthelezi.
Daluxolo explained, “I could not have divulged the truth because I would have been killed.”206
This was even more pressing for Daluxolo because he was staying in Ulundi at the time- the

204

Douek, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa, 89-90
Goldstone, et al, “The Goldstone Booklet,” Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence
and Intimidation, Oct. 27, 1994, https://hurisa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/Goldstone-Booklet.pdf.
206 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Dalaqolo W. Luthuli,” TRC Amnesty Hearings, Day 1.
205

74

heart of Inkatha operations.207 Despite his own inability to truthfully testify at the Goldstone
Commission, Daluxolo still later facilitated the truth to come out.
eSikhawini Hit Squad, 1990-1993
Before he was recalled to Ulundi, Daluxolo worked with Captain Langeni, Prince Gideon
Zulu (from the Zulu Royal Family), and other local Inkatha leadership to set up a hit squad in
eSikhawini, a township south of Richard’s Bay. Daluxolo collected Caprivians from surrounding
areas and brought them to eSikhawini to be placed under the command of Captain Langeni who
answered to Prince Gideon Zulu and the local Inkatha leadership. The first person Daluxolo
asked was Brian Mkhize, who had worked under Daluxolo before (Daluxolo referred to him by
his middle name Quna). Because Daluxolo was not involved in the eSikhawini hit squad’s
activities beyond its inception we will mostly follow Mkhize’s report of events. Daluxolo also
added Caprivi operatives Zweli Ndlamini and Israel Hlongwane who had been active around
Durban and Pietermaritzburg and were recognized by Inkatha for their successful operations in
those areas. Prince Gideon Zulu also called for Themba Xhosa who was previously operating in
Johannesburg.208 This formed the heart of the eSikhawini hit squad, but Mkhize notes that
members were added at later times, even those who were not Caprivi operatives.209
The situation in eSikhawini in the 1990s was similar to that of Mpumalanga in the late
1980s. eSikhawini and the surrounding area were divided by political influence and party with
whole sections being dominated by Inkatha and opposing areas likewise dominated by the
ANC/UDF. Certain shops and shibeens (also written shebeen, they are illicit or illegal bars
owned and frequented by Africans in townships) in the area were also divided by political
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influence with them often acting as congregating points. ANC supporters could not frequent
Inkatha controlled shops and shibeens and vice versa. These areas would also be frequently
targeted with violence and shootings because of their political affiliation, regardless of whether
important political figures were in that location or not.210
This was the kind of everyday violence and ongoing war that preoccupied the Caprivi
operatives and Inkatha at large as they struggled for total control with the ANC/UDF. Conflict
also provided Inkatha with a way to enrich itself and help offset some of the costs of the war it
was waging. Mkhize described that, “J2 for example is known to be an IFP area. There is nobody
who resides in that area who would not take out or pay a certain amount towards the IFP. People
would pay and donate, people who were in charge of protecting the community, would be
paid.”211 Caprivians, as well as Inkatha supporters at large, who engaged in violence in
eSikhawini saw themselves as the protectors of these areas and as such used the community to
pay them for that privilege. As elsewhere in KwaZulu-Natal, Inkatha engaged in a form of
racketeering just under the guise of political alignment and protecting the people. Mkhize further
states the purpose of collecting money was too, “buy guns and indistinct [supplies?] … to
strengthen the people and therefore anybody who resided in that section belonging to the
organization would be expected to pay these monies, even though it would be against his or her
will, but such a person would pay these monies and attend meetings because if that person did
not do that, such a person would be attacked and ex-communicated.”212 Again we see the
motives of opportunistic violence and coercion meld as Mkhize says that anyone who refused to
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pay was faced with the very real threat of violence. Additionally, some of the money went not
only to the personal enrichment of the local Inkatha supporters but to continuing the cycle of
violence between Inkatha and the ANC/UDF in eSikhawini.
Beyond the everyday violence of eSikhawini, the Caprivian hit squad was tasked with
eliminating particular targets and attacking ANC/UDF stronghold/meeting areas. In 1992,
Mkhize and his fellow Caprivians were tasked with assassinating several individuals which the
local Inkatha leadership saw as “problematic.”213 Four of these targets were actually KwaZulu
Policemen who were selected because they appeared to be double agents, working for the ANC,
or giving information to investigative bodies such as the Goldstone Commission. The evidence
on which these policemen were accused of being double agents or informers was sometimes
limited at best. For example, one man was accused of being a double agent because he was seen
with a person affiliated with the ANC and it was rumored he was being paid by the ANC for
information.214 Another man was suspected because he was seen doing “anti-Inkatha” activities
such as swearing at a portrait of Chief Buthelezi or being angered by Inkatha members utilizing
state vehicles for transporting people to rallies. It was later put forth that he was giving
information to the Goldstone Commission which confirmed him as a target for assassination.215
Eliminating these fellow policemen was a high priority for local leadership and the
Caprivi operatives because it jeopardized them directly. Mkhize explained, “we were no longer
safe because we could be arrested and attacked.”216 Besides the fact that it often affected them
directly, the Caprivians were also likely selected to carry out these hits because the Caprivians
were highly trusted by Inkatha leadership thus making them well suited for taking care of
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internal enemies. “Regular” Inkatha supporters may not have been trusted to follow through on
killing one of their own.
Mkhize and his fellow Caprivi operatives were also utilized to assassinate a number of
important ANC members in eSikhawini and carry out attacks deep within ANC dominated areas
intended to threaten and terrorize the people living there. Targets for assassination included ANC
hitmen and a local ANC organizer.217 As part of a general strategy of terror and show of force as
pushed by Prince Gideon Zulu, Mkhize and his fellow hitmen were supposed to attack areas
known to be frequented by the ANC/UDF and visible to the public. Mkhize, Joyful Mthethwaanother Caprivian, and Victor Buthelezi- not a Caprivian but a trusted policeman and bodyguard
used by Inkatha leadership- organized themselves to attack a bus stop in eSikhawini that Mkhize
refers to as the Gundani bus stop. Mkhize states that the Gundani bus stop was chosen because it
was near a shibeen of the same name frequented by ANC supporters and many ANC supporters
were going to be at this bus stop to be transported to an ANC rally happening the same day as the
attack. Using a hand grenade and automatic weapons the three men unleashed hell on a bus and
surrounding area killing and wounding an unknown number of people. Mkhize recalled that
several people died, and more were injured. Captain Langeni was excited by this when Mkhize
reported back to him after they had completed the attack.218
The Caprivians were also rewarded in kind for carrying out these types of activities. For
example, Mkhize explains that because of the level of trust he had with Inkatha leadership and
the large number of operations he had completed on their behalf, he was able to get perks and
gifts. One such gift was a car that was given to him by the KwaZulu government and a card to

Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” TRC Amnesty Hearings, Richard’s Bay, Day 5;
ANC hitmen and/or MK operatives would often be carrying out similar activities to Inkatha but obviously targeting
Inkatha VIPs and operatives. Targeted assassinations and attacks on known Inkatha controlled areas were the norm.
218 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Brian Quna Mkhize,” TRC Amnesty Hearings, Richard’s Bay, Day 5.
217

78

pay for gas for the car. He was given the car to help him get around South Africa in the course of
his job as a Caprivi operative, but he describes that he also used it for personal use and used the
car for over 5,000 kilometers.219 Mkhize described that he could get access to KwaZulu
government vehicles easily even for mundane activities like moving furniture.220 Additionally,
Mkhize mentions that he was able to receive money from Inkatha in many instances and for
general use, not related to his “work” for Inkatha. Mkhize recalled in one case, “one day I
wanted R2,300 to go and pay for my house at Dundee. A house that I had just bought. They
easily gave me the money and I did not pay it back. And it was not even indicated that I should
pay it back.”221 After describing all these perks and gifts, Mkhize flatly told the TRC, “those are
the kinds of things that motivated me to continue the struggle in which I was engaged.”222
Even though money, gifts, and perks came easy for Caprivians like Mkhize, the
protection from arrest and killing he was supposed to be afforded by Inkatha and the KwaZulu
government did not prove to be so forthcoming. The assassination of policemen and the high
profile attacks the eSikhawini hit squad had been carrying out had put them further in the public
eye and made them a main concern of the Goldstone Commission. The South African Police
from outside KwaZulu began to investigate the assassinations of the policemen. This proved a be
a problem for Inkatha as they could not make the charges so easily disappear as they had before.
Inkatha did not have the same power and sway with the SAP outside of KwaZulu and the SAP
would likely not drop a case already being investigated by the Goldstone Commission. Between
eyewitness testimony and bullet cases linking them to the crime scenes, most of the various hit
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squad members in eSikhawini were arrested except for Mkhize. At this time Daluxolo was sent
to eSikhawini to take Mkhize to meet the Inkatha leadership and then take him into hiding.
Daluxolo took Mkhize to Ulundi where they met with Captain Lengani and M. R.
Mzimela. Lengani and Mzimela suggested that Mkhize go into hiding, but Mkhize responded
that he did not want to go into hiding because he would have to remain in hiding for a long time.
Unable to sway him further Lengani and Mzimela told Mkhize that they would see what they
could do to make the case against him disappear and get him a lawyer. Daluxolo then took
Mkhize back to his home.223 Later, on the 18th of August 1993 Mkhize turned himself in at his
own police station, not wishing to hide any longer.224
Despite the promises made to him by high levels of Inkatha leadership such as M. Z.
Khumalo towards the beginning of his operations as a Caprivi operative and the more recent
promises of Captain Lengani and M. R. Mzimela, little was done to help Mkhize. In the past,
Inkatha leaders would have worked with their Apartheid state counterparts in MI and the SAP to
make the case disappear/drop the charges but the officers who helped organize Operation
Marion had been forced to be more covert since the 1990s, especially due to Inkathagate.225 This
would have been especially true in Mkhize’s case due to the fact that his case was part of the
Goldstone Commission investigation and thus highly public. Furthermore, MI already expressed
their willingness to leave Inkatha members holding the bag or worse have them assassinated
(such as the close call Daluxolo had earlier), rather than risk exposure.226 Inkatha leadership
faced with many of the same risks, decided to distance themselves and did not even bother to
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provide Mkhize with a lawyer. The leadership further publicly distanced themselves from the
other Caprivians arrested and any Caprivi activities they themselves ordered and organized.227
Daluxolo did not want to sit idly by as his comrade and man he felt responsible for was
left behind in prison and he wanted to ensure at the least he would have a good lawyer. Daluxolo
explained that “I found difficulties because no one wanted to get closer to me and closer to them,
and I concluded that I should get closer and on getting closer, I went to Mzimela and M. Z.
Khumalo, pleading with them to assist. They pushed me from pillar to post, I ended up loosing
[sic] courage.”228 Faced with no other option and his growing distrust of Inkatha and disgust at
the leadership’s unwillingness to protect their own, Daluxolo decided on a personal meeting with
Mkhize while he was in prison. Daluxolo informed Mkhize that the only way he could possibly
get at least a better sentence was to cooperate with the Goldstone Commission, to tell them
everything he knew. Furthermore, Daluxolo heard rumors of a reconciliation process and
possibility for amnesty in the future and encouraged him to testify before that body too when he
was able.229
Election or Civil War? 1994-1996
In 1994 South Africa was near to holding a historic election but also teetered on the brink
of complete civil war. Inkatha seemed to be only cementing their position with the white right
wing and preparing weapons and personnel for an expanded conflict. The Goldstone
Commission began to release and publish its findings including the testimony of Mkhize about
his Caprivi and hit squad activities. Inkatha leadership was outraged by the findings and angered
by the betrayal and Daluxolo had to feign the same emotions.230 Daluxolo had seen the writing
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on the wall and Mkhize’s testimony was another push towards Daluxolo abandoning Inkatha.
Shortly after this, Inkatha leadership’s trust in Daluxolo had run out. M. Z. Khumalo, who had
previously worked so closely with Daluxolo, started a rumor that he was working with the ANC
and the ANC were providing him with gifts so that he would defect. This was not true, claims
Daluxolo, but regardless the rumor was gaining ground. It became even more apparent to
Daluxolo that he was running out of time and that came with the very real risk that he could be
the next assassination target. Daluxolo was in fact tipped off to this effect by some of his fellow
Caprivians in early 1994.231
Daluxolo was fortunate that his men had trust in him. Daluxolo was close with many of
his fellow Caprivians who had even attended his wedding.232 This trust also built since the men
met at Caprivi because they had fought and killed with Daluxolo directly on the streets rather
than the higher Inkatha leadership which seemed detached in Ulundi. By 1994 many were less
willing to blindly follow Inkatha’s leadership as the election grew closer, thus Daluxolo was
spared assassination from one of his own. This did not mean, however, that he was safe.
Daluxolo heard rumors that M. Z. Khumalo was in talks with MI to have him killed.233 Daluxolo
needed to quickly come up with a plan. The obvious answer to Daluxolo was that he needed to
get back in contact with the ANC who were appearing more and more to be the victors in the
upcoming election and thus the new rulers of the country. Daluxolo could not easily walk up to
the ANC and switch sides, however. He had spent years fighting against them and was well
known to be a high level leader in Inkatha.
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Daluxolo put out feelers to men under him that may have known people in the
government investigative bodies and people that were ANC sympathetic or had ANC
connections that Daluxolo was willing to talk. He started talking with officers working with the
Transitional Executive Council (TEC), but things were moving slowly and there was still the risk
that MI or others would catch wind of these talks.234 By a stroke of luck Daluxolo heard from a
Inkatha member that a man he worked with was named Thula Bopela, the same name of a former
MK fighter Daluxolo was close friends with and fought with during the Wankie Campaign in
then Rhodesia in 1967. Daluxolo took a gamble and called the man who turned out to in fact be
his friend from all those years ago. Daluxolo had some of his fellow Caprivians watch and
surveil Bopela because while Daluxolo had been close friends with him, it had been many years.
Daluxolo did not know if Bopela was still working for MK and worried that he might set
Daluxolo up for an ambush if they tried to meet. Eventually Daluxolo agreed to meet Bopela.235
Daluxolo told Bopela all that happened to him since they were separated at the Botswana
border and both men were arrested. Daluxolo explained how he got into Inkatha and why he
continued to side with them after their split with the ANC, and how MI had been playing both
sides to continue black on black violence. Daluxolo ended his retelling of events by informing
Bopela about Inkatha’s recent plan to work with right-wingers to push South Africa into a full
civil war.236 Daluxolo then pleaded with Bopela to get him into a meeting with any ANC
contacts he had left and vouch for him. Daluxolo promised he would provide the ANC with
information and told Bopela “I’m the commander-in-chief of all IFP hit squads…If I tell my men
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to stop fighting the UDF, they’ll obey me.”237 After some more convincing and time alone with
his old comrade, Bopela finally agreed, he would speak with Jacob Zuma, a high ranking ANC
official at the time (and a future president of South Africa). Daluxolo thanked his friend and told
him “I accept that I have betrayed the ANC, Thula… We should now focus on the future and
decide what to do to frustrate the strategies of the apartheid government. We cannot allow them
to roll back the liberation struggle. I’ll leave it in your hands. See Zuma and explain things. Let
him decide what should be done.”238 The men shook hands but before he left Bopela asked “How
can you be sure I won’t kill you for betraying the cause?” Daluxolo responded “I know you well
enough. If given the choice of killing me or stopping a counter-revolution, I think that both you
and Jacob Zuma will opt for the latter. I could be wrong, of course.”239 The two men laughed it
off, still able to joke at the absurdity and weight of their predicament.
Bopela’s service in the Wankie campaign impressed Zuma and gave his words weight
when the two men first met. Bopela told Zuma of Daluxolo’s story of how he had served in the
Wankie campaign as well and how he had become the leader of Inkatha hit squad activities.
Bopela also told him that Daluxolo knew of Inkatha’s alliance with right wingers and elements
of the security branch who wanted to start a civil war rather than abide by the upcoming election.
Bopela went to explain Daluxolo’s position, “He says he has convinced his men that they should
pull out of the IFP and expose hit squad activity to the newspapers and the TEC [Transitional
Executive Council]. He is willing to do this on condition that all ANC military activities against
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the IFP are also stopped.”240 Zuma thought for a long moment staring into the distance until he
turned back to Bopela, finally agreeing to a meeting with Daluxolo.241
At his meeting with Zuma, Daluxolo reiterated his position as outlined by Bopela, who
was silent for most of the meeting having little to add. The two men talked for over an hour
making headway and the beginning of promises. Daluxolo reiterated his wish to stop the
Caprivians from further involvement in the violence and Zuma began to make assurances that the
ANC would act accordingly and provide protection for Daluxolo, but nothing was yet certain.
Everyone left the meeting and there was no contact for several days.242 Eventually Zuma
contacted Daluxolo again offering another meeting this time with President Nelson Mandela.
Daluxolo was initially hesitant fearing that this was a trap to have him assassinated. Daluxolo
agreed to the meeting only after he was assured it was safe and his friend Bopela could be there
with him.243
Despite the apprehensions and cloak and dagger, the meeting between Daluxolo and
Mandela went on without incident. Mandela showed his total trust and faith in Daluxolo. Bopela
recalled, “For his part, Daluxolo was overcome with emotion and wept openly. It was an
amazing moment. There was this great man, tall and upright, accepting the apologies of a man
who had once been his soldier- but who had defected to the enemy. Now he had returned to the
ANC fold. All was forgiven.”244
Daluxolo was safe at last and entered the witness protection program, staying in Denmark
until the ANC ascended to power after the successful election. Inkatha at almost the last moment
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agreed to negotiations with ANC and participated in the elections. There were a variety of
reasons for this decision but Daluxolo’s defection and the unwillingness of most Caprivians to
back Inkatha any longer certainly played a role. The civil war that many feared was coming had
been avoided and the ANC won the election by a landslide. Daluxolo was able to return to South
Africa and received amnesty after telling the TRC about his activities with Inkatha, Military
Intelligence, and the Caprivi operatives. Daluxolo would later become a lieutenant-colonel in the
new South African National Defense Force.
Daluxolo and his fellow Caprivi operatives are arguably some of the most important
individuals in the epic that is the violent political struggle between the ANC/UDF and Inkatha.
They are often written about but rarely named. Their actions are used in commentaries on
Inkatha and the Security branch, but little has been written about the motives of these men
themselves. Like the rest of Inkatha, the Caprivians are no monolith obeying every word of
Buthelezi or blindly pushed forward by ethnic nationalism. The fact that many Caprivians under
Daluxolo defected and still others were angrily left in the lurch by Inkatha leadership proves that
the leadership did not have complete control. Furthermore, the number of Zulus, ANC aligned or
non-aligned, killed by Caprivians proves that ethnicity was not factored in the vast majority of
cases. Instead, we can again apply the motivators outlined throughout this thesis to the Caprivi
operatives.
Daluxolo provides an example of a man convinced by Inkatha’s propaganda ability. The
fact that he was previously an ANC and MK member gives credence to Inkatha’s propaganda
apparatus which effectively vilified the ANC/UDF and provided the raison d'être to kill this
enemy. Furthermore, Daluxolo was so involved that he became a propagandist himself further
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confirming this point, as do the other Caprivians who commented on the importance of
propaganda in their training.
Multiple Caprivians such as Brian Mkhize were likewise motivated by the opportunities,
financial or otherwise, provided by working for Inkatha as a hitman. The promise of good, steady
pay in the face of economic downturn proved to be alluring for some of the men to initially join.
The pay increase after training and various financial incentives provided by full-time work in
Inkatha motivated these men to continue killing even more. Those that were good at the violence
Inkatha required were singled out for praise and given greater rewards ranging from cash to cars
to help acquiring a house.
The carrot, of course, is always preferable to the stick which proved to be an ever present
and powerful motivator that kept the Caprivi operatives in line. Caprivians were no strangers to
killing off their own, one will recall the Caprivi operative’s euphemism for this being “made to
take the first bus.” Inkatha leadership was also more than willing to outsource this killing if
necessary to white security personnel who had no qualms assassinating blacks. The fear of death
is a powerful motivator that kept many like Daluxolo from stopping or switching sides until they
could be assured that they would be protected.
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Conclusion
The deep dive this thesis has taken into one group that were but one part of the struggle
for liberation and democracy in South Africa may give the reader pause. The fact is that despite
it being a grand historical moment, the end of Apartheid is often lacking in detail to the average
reader, even an academic one. This is in no small part due to the smaller role African history has
in the profession but also because the relatively recent end of Apartheid. This recentness perhaps
made it an unsuitable topic for many historians to tackle for some time. In spite of- or perhaps
because of- these reasons this topic is one worthy of further examination, especially now. There
are still many stories left in uncovering the end of Apartheid in South Africa and they should be
told before their keepers forget them or they are lost to time. The prevailing myth of the peaceful
end of Apartheid, particularly in the West, would on its surface make the language and lens of
war seem strange to apply to this area. Hopefully the reader has seen that throughout this thesis
the language of war was not applied after the fact but used every day in the struggle South
Africans waged for years. This also exemplifies the need to study the social and societal aspects
of this conflict. The violence explored in this thesis is deeply personal and it tore communities
and even families apart. Taking a social approach and understanding why the supporters of
Inkatha engaged in violence is intended not only to create a better understanding of Inkatha but
also of the entire conflict in KwaZulu-Natal. Despite unclear battle lines and confusing friends
and foes, the low level civil war of KwaZulu-Natal and covert war waged between various
Security Branch forces and the ANC should not be understood in any other way.
It would have been impossible to take a purely historian focused approach to this thesis,
many times the motives of Inkatha could only be best understood through the lens of a political
scientist. On their face many of the actions of Inkatha do not make sense from the outside
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looking in, but to a realist politician (which one could argue Chief Buthelezi was) the
doublespeak and covert actions could all be justified in the name of political gains and survival.
In mentioning doublespeak, skills in history, political science, and even literature all had to be
applied in the service of researching and writing about propaganda. Metaphors and abstractions
can have very real impacts in the fickle and confusing world of propaganda, an area of study
relatively few have used in the study of Inkatha.
In the service of these goals and fields of study, this thesis seeks to explain why Inkatha
members and supporters engaged in violence on behalf of a self-proclaimed non-violent
organization. While it is not possible to answer this question completely, as it is individual to
each member, the three categories described throughout this thesis demonstrate the wide range of
motivating factors. For example, Inkatha’s use of propaganda to blame its political rivals for
violence and to justify its own violent actions as “defensive” signaled to its supporters that
violence was acceptable and even necessary. While the aim of this propaganda was political, the
justification of violence was sophisticated and aware enough to go beyond mere aggrandizement
of the organization. Instead, Inkatha’s propaganda was able to engage in complex manipulation
allowing them to turn a large section of the KwaZulu population into supporters. And in turn
able to convince these supporters of a vilified enemy worthy of being meet with necessary
violence. These justifications and Inkatha’s embracement of policies like “an eye for an eye”
certainly played a role in the vicious cycle of violence that characterized the low-intensity civil
war in KwaZulu-Natal.
For those who were not swayed by the violent messages in Inkatha’s propaganda, they
could be forced to participate in the violence against their will. Both those that supported Inkatha
and those who were whole-heartedly opposed were told to pick up a weapon and fight. Dire
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consequences directed at their person, their family, or their property befell those that refused.
Inkatha’s base, as illustrated throughout this paper, was clearly not a monolith of Zulu nationals
all fighting for the same end, and as such, modern scholarship has largely begun to move beyond
this notion. Reaching beyond this characterization of Inkatha supporters, the extensive use of
coercion puts into question how many supporters truly had agency in the face of violence. At the
very least, the question now arises as to how much the Inkatha supporter base willingly agreed
with or supported the organization’s unofficial policy of violence.
Finally, there are those who were allured by what they might gain through violence or
pushed towards the use of violence to survive. Working directly for Inkatha as a high status
member or professional hitman was a road to money and power for some. Local chiefs,
headmen, and Inkatha officials exerting their influence and power over those under them to
engage in violence was common. This desire to amass wealth and power are prime examples of
opportunistic trend that drove so much of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal. For others that joined
in on Inkatha’s lucrative raids the motives of survival and opportunism are seen in the theft of
everything from groceries to television sets from those deemed to be the enemy of Inkatha. The
vast range of items of seemingly low value taken shows that economic situation had taken its toll
and survival motivated many. Still others sought personal enrichment in targeting affluent areas
for luxury items. Violence in KwaZulu-Natal was rapid and brutal as is often expected in
situations of political violence that spin out into low-intensity civil wars. This prevailing
atmosphere of violence coupled with the economic downturn of South Africa in the 1980s and
90s makes it seem almost unavoidable that fighting for money or even groceries would motivate
so many. The proverbial barrier of entry was lowered, and more fuel was added to the fire.
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Discussing and understanding the motivations of Inkatha’s supporters and why they
choose or were forced to engage in violence are crucial because it paints a different picture than
that of a purely political or top-down history of Inkatha. In many cases, it could be argued that
politics didn’t factor at all into the motivations of violence for some Inkatha supporters. To the
man who stole to survive as part of an Inkatha raid, the political ‘why?’ may hardly seem
relevant. This sentiment is glaringly apparent in the testimonies of those forced to fight against
their will. Furthermore, the ability of Inkatha to rally support is woefully under-appreciated by
those that describe them as a purely Zulu nationalist organization. Inkatha’s use of propaganda
demonstrated their understanding of what motivated their supporters. Such as the numerous
times Inkatha manipulated their supporters’ desires for personal and economic safety to recruit
and encourage violence on the organization's behalf. Only by understanding the motivations of
those who actually committed the violence is it truly possible to understand the nature of the
violence in KwaZulu-Natal in the 1980s and 90s and Inkatha’s dominating role in it.
Epilogue
Although this thesis’s discussion of violence in KwaZulu-Natal ends just after the 1994
election, the violence did not. Particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, tensions and violence remained
high due to Inkatha’s attempts to influence the local election in 1996, to continue to exert control
over the new local KwaZulu-Natal government. Inkatha had a strong enough showing in the
1994 general election to be part of the coalition government with their previously professed
enemy, the ANC, yet Inkatha support continued to dwindle. Today, Inkatha remains a political
player as the Inkatha Freedom Party but has limited seats in the national government and
currently heads the opposition in the KwaZulu-Natal provincial legislature.
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Violence continues to be a problem in KwaZulu-Natal, as within the rest of South Africa;
however, most of the violence today is primarily due to criminal activity. The large amount and
easy access to weapons combined with continued economic hardship faced by so many means
crime has remained a central issue in South Africa. Continued economic woes and corruption
mean that South Africa still has a long road ahead of her. In the middle of writing this thesis, in
July 2021, South Africa experienced the worst unrest since the end of Apartheid and much of it
was centered in KwaZulu-Natal. Over 300 people died and over 3,400 people were arrested.
Former President Jacob Zuma was arrested due to failing to appear in court for charges related to
corruption during his presidency and his supporters took to the streets to protest.245 There
appears to be some cloak and dagger among Zuma’s supporters who encouraged the protests to
turn to riots and the police are already investigating certain individuals with ties to Zuma.246
However, most of the experts and media agree that the majority of those involved were
not politically motivated as seen by the general motive of looting and theft. South Africa has
over half of its population living in poverty and a 32% unemployment rate.247 Descriptors of
tribalism, racism, and politics have all be posited as motivators and while this may have been
true in some cases, it is impossible to ignore the state of South Africa’s economy as the
overwhelming motivator for most. The targets of the riots being shops, malls, shipping trucks,
and shipping containers further speak to this motive. The billions of dollars in damages and
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looting, the ongoing global pandemic, and continuing if not rising income inequality place South
Africa on a tough course ahead.248 Let’s hope she can weather the storm.
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